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Over three days, May 8–10, 2019, Thomas G. Weiss, Presidential Professor of Political
Science at the CUNY Graduate Center, and I convened at the Getty Center nineteen
scholars and practitioners of different specialties and experience to discuss the topic
“Cultural Heritage under Siege.” In one way or another, we had been discussing this topic
for three years. The purpose of the convening was to begin to finalize the shape and
substance of the book we decided needed to be written, Cultural Heritage and Mass
Atrocities: Human and Security Costs, to be published by Getty Publications in 2022.
Although many of the participants in the convening are contributing to the book as
authors, all of the participants contributed to its shape and substance in some way. Tom
and I are deeply grateful to everyone who attended the convening. The presentations,
discussions, and debates were inspiring, and the warmth of friendship was gratifying.
In this, the fourth publication in the series J. Paul Getty Trust Occasional Papers in
Cultural Heritage Policy, we are presenting an edited version of the papers and discussion
at the convening, which was organized in five sections, in addition to Opening and
Concluding Remarks:
Populations at Risk
Cultural Heritage at Risk
Military Perspectives and Costs: War, Occupation, and Intervention
International Law: Problems and Prospects
Social and Cultural Costs
Before the opening dinner, Irina Bokova, former director-general of UNESCO (2009–17),
set the stage of our convening with poignant and illuminating remarks. We thank her for
her many contributions to our meetings, just as we thank all those who generously
participated with their formal and informal papers and commentary.
James Cuno, co-convenor
President and CEO
J. Paul Getty Trust
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INTRODUCTION
JAMES CUNO We are meeting less than three weeks after the Easter Sunday suicide
bombings in Sri Lanka, which claimed more than three hundred lives. ISIS, which was
said to have been totally defeated just two months before, claimed credit for the bombings
and released a video of its leader, Abū Bakr al-Baghdadi, seen for the first time in five
years, calling on his jihadist followers to rally around his vision for ISIS. “Our battle
today,” he said, “is a battle of attrition, and we will prolong it for the enemy. And they must
know that the jihad will continue until Judgment Day.” One of the Sri Lankan bombers,
Jameel Mohamed Abdul Lathief, traveled to Raqqa, Syria, in 2014. There he trained with
ISIS for three to six months, before returning to recruit others and to carry out the attacks.
The Sri Lankan Islamist group Jamiyyathul Millatu Ibrahim recruited for ISIS and joined
forces with the Islamist preacher Zahran Hashim, the alleged organizer of the Easter
Sunday attacks. Days before, he is said to have organized attacks on Buddhist sculptures.
As a result of those earlier attacks, police in Manawela arrested thirteen people.
The question many journalists have asked is, what relationship might there be between
those two kinds of violent attacks, on cultural heritage and on the lives of those who
profess a cultural identity with them and what they represent? The prime minister of Sri
Lanka, Ranil Wickremesinghe, noted a few days after the suicide bombings, “We know
that before the Buddhist images, there were attacks on Sufi mosques, so they seem to be
going step by step. First their own Muslims, Sufis, then the Buddhists. And there was
something in a small church near Kandy, Kandukuri, information that they wanted to
damage the church.”
For the better part of three years, the Getty has organized meetings with a wide range
of experts to help shed light on the meaning and consequences of and interrelations
between attacks on cultural objects, structures, and monuments and attacks on civilian
populations. To this end, we have published two Occasional Papers. The co-author of the
first Occasional Paper, Tom Weiss, is my co-convener of this meeting; the author of the
second, Edward Luck is participating in this meeting. The authors of the third Occasional
Paper, Helen Frowe and Derek Matravers, are also here with us today.
Together, these three papers and our many meetings have convinced us that there is a
profound connection between attacks on cultural heritage and attacks on civilian
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populations, a connection Heinrich Heine first identified in 1835 when he famously said,
“First they burn the books, then they burn the bodies.” Such connections vary. They may
be iconoclastic, like the ISIS attacks on Palmyra and the Islamist attacks on the
mausoleums and tombs of Sufi saints in Mali; or they may be the result of targeted
military attacks, like damage to the Umayyad Great Mosque of Aleppo, of which a local
resident, Muhammed Marsi, standing with his son in front of it, said, shaking his head and
sighing, “The destruction for the whole country is undescribable [sic], just like what
happened to the mosque. If you knew the mosque before the damage and saw it now, it is
like someone who lost a child or a part of his body.”
Such connections between attacks on cultural heritage and attacks on civilian
populations caused the Polish Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin to write of genocide, a term
he coined in 1944, as not necessarily meaning the immediate destruction of a nation but
rather as signifying a coordinated plan of different actions aimed at the destruction of
essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the ultimate goal of annihilating
the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the
political and social institutions, of culture, of language, national feelings, religion, and the
economic existence of national groups and the destruction of the personal security, liberty,
health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. This, in all
but name, is cultural genocide.
Over the next day and a half, we are going to explore connections between violence
perpetrated against objects, monuments, and institutions of culture and the people who
identify themselves with or against them, whether in Iraq, Syria, Mali, Sri Lanka, or
elsewhere. Our intention is to produce, with inputs from this meeting, a book that details,
contextualizes, and provides research resources for the development of a legal and
political framework for the protection of cultural heritage in zones of armed conflict. To
that end, we encourage you to participate in this book, to make recommendations of other
authors and suggest the most useful, important, and practical resources to advance the
adoption and implementation of this crucial framework. Thank you very much for joining
us.
THOMAS G. WEISS I think we should begin with first principles. And the very first
principle is that of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), namely, humanity
or the sacred quality of human life. I want to pick up on Jim’s point that we see these
issues, the protection of people and the protection of heritage, as intimately intertwined.
The problem is going to arise, of course, that some humanitarians do not agree with us.
They see a priority, and we can do one thing rather than the other. So part of the
assignment will be to look at the question as to whether there are tradeoffs between
protecting people and protecting heritage. Do you have to do one or the other, or can you,
and must you, do both?
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I begin with a puzzle: the onslaught against the heritage is overwhelmingly and
universally condemned and thus is different from virtually every other issue that I study,
in which there is always contestation, significant contestation, both in the public and in
the private sphere. But that disparity does not exist for this issue. And moreover, there is
no significant fault line between the politics of the North and the Global South, to the
extent that you think those categories make sense.
So there is no sympathy, and yet there is little or no action. Non-state actors use the
destruction to undermine governments and their authority, as well as the values, norms,
principles, and institutions that constitute international society. We are hoping, at the end
of the book, to come up with some policy solutions that may actually lead to more action.
So I thought that I would give a quick reading of what I think the literature tells us to date.
And I will start with the bad news, then move on to what I think is a little better news.
What is driving the onslaught, the attacks, the onslaught against cultural heritage?
It seems to me that we are talking about six challenges. First, of course, we live with
growth in the numbers, kinds, and level of arms of non-state actors. Second, picking up the
pieces from civil wars is now the business of politicians, militaries, and humanitarians
worldwide. This includes even NATO but also, obviously, the institutions and the
international law we have built for interstate conflicts. The operational and legal
challenges are totally different in Afghanistan or Yemen or Syria. Third, we suffer from
the rise of toxic identity politics. The most recent issue of Foreign Affairs has referred to
“the new nationalisms.” This is not a Western oligopoly. Tribalism is everywhere. And in
war zones, mass atrocities and cultural destruction occur almost everywhere. Fourth,
armed belligerents and governments are slugging away in urban areas. This creates
certain problems, because there are legitimate military targets in places like Baghdad or
Aleppo, but the same sites are also surrounded by civilians. So this is not an easy
assignment, to figure out whether to protect the civilians or the sites and go after
legitimate military targets. Fifth, we are confronting the prevalence of asymmetric
warfare. Sixth, there is the ubiquity of media, in particular social media, that does the kind
of made-for-TV or -YouTube destruction of symbols and decapitations. Irina Bokova
mentioned last night keeping track of what was going on in Mosul from her office and not
being able to watch the end of it.
There is a label, “new wars,” that is often applied to contemporary conflicts, so that in
addition to the attacks on cultural heritage, our preoccupation, there are high civilian
casualties, taxes on humanitarians, and illegal trafficking. This label is contested for a
number of reasons, not least of which is that none of those factors, or the destruction of
cultural heritage, is new. But I personally think that the fusion, the intensity of all these
factors, presents a kind of quantitative change in the nature of war that effectively
amounts to a qualitatively new challenge. So that’s the bad news.
What’s the good news? I hope that some of these elements encourage us to struggle in
the course of this research project to find a better framework for thinking about better
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policies and norms and, we hope someday, action. The good news is, I think, relevant for
someone like me and others who live and breathe in intergovernmental organizations like
the UN or UNESCO. It is important that for immovable cultural heritage there is no clash
between what I see as the cultural nationalists, who are pursuing a postcolonial agenda,
and cultural internationalists or cosmopolitans, who are looking at the universal value of
cultural heritage. This issue is really quite distinct from the vitriolic negotiations that
surround movable cultural heritage, which is where the bulk of most previous analytical
work on heritage has taken place. I do not see that sovereignty or the lack of consent from
governments is the issue. The lack of consent from insurgents, yes; but from governments,
no, it is not the main problem. It is the lack of political will or decision-making apathy.
So wanton non-state destruction facilitates, it seems to me, or should facilitate,
conversations in intergovernmental fora, including those about counterterrorism, which
is what has motivated the Security Council. There are other indications of international
receptivity, however: the International Criminal Court (ICC) decision on al-Mahdi after
Timbuktu; the insertion of a protection mandate in the Mali operation for the UN. So, the
second piece of good news, I think, is the increased attention to protecting heritage, which
I believe resembles the seismic shift that occurred in the 1990s with regard to protecting
civilians. That was always an aspiration, but it suddenly became the central item in many
conversations, intergovernmental and nongovernmental. At the outset of the decade, one
looked at northern Iraq and Somalia as somehow exceptional, as aberrations. The first
effort after the first UN operation since Korea, followed by the intervention in northern
Iraq, was in Somalia. That was supposed to be sui generis; the resolution used the word
humanitarian, the “H” word, eighteen times to suggest that we were not setting any
precedents anywhere. The Commission on Global Governance actually made a
recommendation that there should be a Charter amendment to permit the Security
Council to act if there were humanitarian emergencies. Well, by the time their report was
published, not only had those two exceptions taken place but also Rwanda and Haiti and,
subsequently, Kosovo, the Balkans, and East Timor. Their recommendation was moot.
While the destruction of cultural heritage certainly is not new, as everybody around
this table knows, I think we can apply the adjective new to the possibilities for perhaps
reframing this issue for noninternational conflicts. We can take advantage of what I think
is a changing political landscape. The question, at the end of the day or the end of
tomorrow, will be, is there a way to take advantage of what I think is a propitious
moment? Moreover, the destruction of heritage is associated in virtually everyone’s mind
with reviled terrorist groups. So it seems to me that the association with high politics gives
us leverage that did not exist prior to the global war on terrorism, which draws the ire of
UN officials, government officials, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals
watching the evening news. I think the advantages of securitization far outweigh the
disadvantages. These three bits of good news are the backdrop for trying to contextualize
the feasibility of rethinking and finding something new to look at in what Irina Bokova
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calls “cultural cleansing” and Edward Luck calls “cultural genocide.” Can political,
military, and normative entrepreneurs take advantage of this moment?
In closing, I want to revert to R2P, the Responsibility to Protect, for two reasons. The
work of the original commission came up with a framework—prevent, react,
rebuild—which is exactly the vocabulary—or at least my reading of the vocabulary—that
is used by museum curators everywhere to think about protecting cultural heritage. And
when prevention fails, which is almost always the case, and sites are attacked and people
are attacked, the next question is, how do you react? And almost inevitably, one also has to
think about what comes next and pick up the pieces afterward. But I return to the
commission for a second reason, which is that my own experience indicates that
reframing an issue in a creative way represents a normative advance and also, in this
case, a practical value: reports and the volume of research alter the way that states,
organizations, and individuals think about, and occasionally actually act on, an issue.
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POPULATIONS AT RISK
SIMON ADAMS Let me start by saying that I think the fundamental challenge of our times
is this: there are currently 68.5 million people in the world who are displaced by
persecution, conflict, and/or mass atrocities, the largest number of people displaced since
World War II. Confronting this crisis is an international system that is worn and fraying at
the edges. Essentially, we have a twentieth-century United Nations trying to deal with
twenty-first-century problems, or, as I think it was once put in an editorial in the
Washington Post, a Remington typewriter UN trying to deal with an iPhone world. There
has been a general decline in interstate conflicts since the end of the Cold War. But the
number of high-intensity conflicts within states has increased since 2007. And over the
past few years, we have seen a particular rise of non-state armed groups, such as the
Islamic State or Boko Haram, that are also fueling mass atrocity crimes in conflicts around
the world. Meanwhile, when we look at the preeminent body of international politics, the
UN Security Council and it is bitterly divided and struggling to cope in a climate of
noncompliance with its resolutions and almost routine violations of the foundations of
international law. So the issue we are discussing today is important. I believe it is deeply
important, and I know many of the people in this room believe that the norms that protect
our fundamental human rights and bind our international community do not live and die
in isolation from one another. They are interlocking, and they are mutually reinforcing.
So to rewind, if I could. The Responsibility to Protect was unanimously adopted at the
UN’s World Summit in 2005, which was the largest single gathering of heads of state and
government in human history. At its heart, R2P is very simple. It concerns four crimes and
three pillars. The core idea is that all governments have an obligation to protect their
citizens from the four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and ethnic cleansing. First, the responsibility to protect people from these
crimes falls first and foremost on the sovereign government. That is pillar 1. Second, the
international community has an obligation to assist any state that is struggling to uphold
its protective responsibilities. That is pillar 2. And third, if a government is manifestly
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unable or unwilling to exercise its responsibility to protect, then the international
community is obligated to act. That is pillar 3. I think the underlying premise, as one of
our friends, Ramesh Thakur, once put it, is a fundamental rejection of both unilateral
interference and institutionalized indifference when it comes to mass atrocities in the
world today. And I think in that sense R2P is a demand-driven norm. What I mean by that
is, as long as mass atrocities exist in the world, the UN Security Council and the
international community, will have to figure out a way to respond. And despite the
progress that has been made, it is always going to be a delicate and imperfect and
probably contentious enterprise. I think that is in part because the ideas surrounding R2P
are inherently disruptive.
So where are we with regard to R2P? Fourteen years after it was adopted, what does
the balance sheet say? On one level, we have made extraordinary progress, in terms of the
proliferation of scholarship, of the ideas seeping into different parts of the global system.
Institutionally, more than a quarter of all UN member states have now appointed a
national R2P focal point and joined the Global Network of R2P Focal Points. This is the
largest governmental network dedicated to preventing mass atrocities, with a focus on
what can be done domestically, regionally, and internationally. The UN Security Council
has adopted more than eighty resolutions that reference R2P. And because of these
resolutions, R2P and the protection of civilians features in the mandates of eight of the
fourteen current UN peacekeeping operations. Those operations involve 95 percent of the
one hundred thousand peacekeepers currently on active duty. The Human Rights Council
has invoked R2P in more than forty-two resolutions and in the findings of several of its
important commissions of inquiry on mass atrocities. This reflects that R2P is not just an
idea, but a guide to early warning and timely action. It has made a real difference in
places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and South
Sudan and in other situations. So those are the positives.
But there have also been setbacks and controversies. To the extent that there is
divisiveness around R2P today, it is rooted in differing perspectives on what to do when
prevention fails and it becomes necessary to act. The record of R2P, like all living
international norms, is not unblemished.
So how does cultural heritage fit into all of this? Jim Cuno already alluded to the fact
that Raphael Lemkin, who was personally responsible for the creation of the term
“genocide,” was acutely aware of the relationship between culture and atrocities. Not least
of all because, as a Polish Jew, he understood, in a very direct and immediate way, the way
in which the Nazis had demolished the cultural underpinnings of Jewish life in Eastern
Europe. So his conception of genocide included “the desecration and destruction of
cultural symbols, destruction of cultural leadership, destruction of cultural centers, and
the prohibition of cultural activities.” But opposition from some UN member states saw
Lemkin’s ideas regarding the connection between culture and genocide excluded from the
final version of the Genocide Convention that was adopted in 1948. I work for the Global
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Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, in New York. We do advocacy with the UN Security
Council and with the Human Rights Council in Geneva, and we work on country situations
in which people are facing the threat of mass atrocities. We started to take this issue a lot
more seriously after the rise of ISIS in 2014, when it became impossible not to see the
connections between these different sorts of things. In all of the lands that were occupied
by ISIS between 2014 and 2017, the armed group systematically set out to destroy what it
considered deviant aspects of Syria’s and Iraq’s cultural heritage. Notoriously, of course, in
the Mosul Museum, ISIS used sledgehammers to deface, topple, and destroy statues from
pre-Islamic Mesopotamia. At Nimrud, they blew up and then bulldozed the ruins of an
ancient Assyrian city. At Palmyra, they famously destroyed the Roman theater and killed
and beheaded Khaled al-Asaad, the archaeologist who had spent most of his life protecting
those ruins. They also burned books in Mosul’s library and engaged in the illegal
trafficking of antiquities for profit. Of course, those acts seem to many people to pale in
comparison to some of ISIS’s other atrocities. In addition, we worked very closely with the
Yazidi community in northern Iraq, so I know the stories of people who survived what ISIS
did. ISIS’s policy represented a systematic attempt to scrub away the identity, the history,
and the memory of entire peoples in Iraq and the Middle East.
Far from hiding these acts of vandalism, ISIS celebrated them. And I’m really glad that
Irina Bokova is with us today, because she deserves an enormous amount of credit within
the UN system for emphasizing cultural cleansing. Of course, as many people here know,
cultural heritage is already protected under the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. It is also considered part of customary
international law by the International Committee for the Red Cross. War crimes also,
according to article 8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, include “intentionally directing
attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, art, education, science, and charitable
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are
collected.” In September 2016, Ahmad al-Mahdi, a member of an armed extremist group
from northern Mali, was found guilty at the ICC of committing a war crime for his role in
the deliberate partial destruction of the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Timbuktu. It was
in response to this, in March 2017, that the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2347,
deploring the destruction of humanity’s shared cultural heritage and noting the ICC
verdict.
Not long after that, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect cohosted an event
with the governments of France and Italy, on the margins of the UN General Assembly, at
which Irina Bokova spoke and at which the ICC chief prosecutor also spoke on how to
protect cultural heritage from terrorism and mass atrocities. Jim Cuno and Tom Weiss
were there, too, and spoke from the floor and circulated a draft of the first Getty
Occasional Paper, for which Tom was the lead author. All of the speakers emphasized that
defending cultural heritage was not just about preserving statues but also about protecting
people. Many people also emphasized that there was a disturbing convergence between
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ISIS’s acts of cultural vandalism and its effort to exterminate entire peoples. Here I quote
Irina Bokova: “In today’s new conflicts, these two dimensions cannot be separated. There
is no need to choose between saving lives and preserving cultural heritage. The two are
inseparable.” I think she was absolutely right to say that, because in my own work with
my own organization we have seen very similar dynamics, in Myanmar, for example, with
the Rohingya, and in other places in the world where atrocities are occurring today.
I want to make one final point. Very recently, we published a policy brief on the Uyghur
situation in China. It was not an easy road to publish that policy brief. First, we had to find
somebody who would write it. The author had to be anonymous and was taking a risk
writing that for us. Further, the author had to be a Mandarin speaker. We jointly
published with some colleagues at the Asia Pacific Center for the Responsibility to Protect.
We also met with the World Uyghur Congress, the main diaspora body of Uyghurs. But the
main point of that policy brief was to talk about the systematic discrimination against
Uyghurs, the laws that are directed against them, and the fact that more than a million
Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in China, are currently in so-called reeducation camps.
But there is a less well known fact. The Chinese government has started to systematically
demolish many historic mosques. Of ninety-one major Uyghur historical and cultural sites
identified by the Uyghur community itself, thirty-three have been destroyed since 2016,
including the Yutian Aitika Mosque near Hotan, which dates to the year 1200 and which
was destroyed—bulldozed, in fact—in March of this year. So when we talk about
protecting cultural heritage, we are talking about defending what makes us human. I
come from an Irish family, and we have a saying in the Irish language that all people, all
human beings, live in the shadow of one another. This always reminded me of another
saying, one that comes from Zulu culture in South Africa, the spirit of ubuntu, which
means that humans are humans through other humans. I think the Responsibility to
Protect is fundamentally about understanding the connection between vulnerable people
and culture and defending both. It is about upholding what makes us human.
EDWARD C. LUCK I want to talk about a couple things that build on some comments that
Simon just made. It seems to me that we have to find a new way of working at this. The
content of the Responsibility to Protect has changed a great deal over time. It had to
morph in a number of ways. And it seems to me that we need a similar overall conception
for the protection of cultural heritage. But if we think of the conceptual piece, we have to
tie it to a strategic framework and, eventually, a political-legal framework that works.
Making these connections, I think, is going to be more difficult than perhaps we initially
realize. I think the need is tremendous. The fact that it is difficult does not mean that we
should not make the effort. But we should not be too sanguine about how the pieces are
going to come together.
When Jim Cuno asked me to write a paper, I thought that looking at a very different
way of framing would be a way to bring a new perspective, new ways of thinking about
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this. I do not think we can apply cultural genocide as such to R2P, for a number of reasons.
Obviously, it has never been accepted by the international community. And the politics are
every bit as difficult today as they were in the years 1946 to 1948. But I do think we should
go back to Raphael Lemkin’s original conception of genocide as having a number of
elements, a number of ways of going about it. He was, of course, looking at the Nazi
experience in eastern Germany, of occupation. And therefore, the number of tools and the
way they used to go about it—in terms of administrative, economic, sociological, all sorts
of different ways—was a sort of totalitarian concept of genocide. And of course, it does not
always work out that way. But it does seem to me that the goal was to destroy other,
inferior cultures. It is crucial, I think, to recognize that cultural identity is fundamental to
all of this. And I think we see that the cultural piece is fundamental, whether this is in the
debates about immigration or movements of people or about identity and the politics of
identity. And the rejection of other cultures and the danger one sees in foreign cultures are
fundamental to much of this. Cultural destruction did not play a big role in the 2001
concept of R2P. It played almost no role in the 2005 outcome document of the member
states. This is not a surprise. We put a little bit about cultural destruction in the 2009
report of the Secretary-General, and I think Jennifer [Welsh] and others have added to that
since; but it still has been treated as a rather minor piece of what R2P is all about. I think
we need to recognize that in the protection of populations, the protection of cultural
heritage should be seen as very much interconnected and interdependent in many ways.
Now, let me say a word or two about why I am not quite so sanguine about all of this. It
is not that I am saying it is not important; I think it is extraordinarily important. Kofi
Annan failed for several years to get the member states to see a connection between
legality, on the one hand, and morality, on another. But it takes iterations to get to
something that works. I think we can see many elements in R2P that would be related. But
we cannot just extend R2P to cultural heritage. You know, we told the member states a
thousand times that this was only about the four crimes and their incitement, and we
would not go an inch beyond that. We told them that the approach was narrow but deep,
and that we would only stick with those four crimes. The only way that R2P was accepted
in 2005 was this understanding that the member states said they needed to know exactly
which crimes this applied to. Because the great suspicion remains today that powerful
states would take something like R2P and apply it to all sorts of different things in
different ways. And you can’t tell them a thousand times that it is only these things, that is
all they have agreed to, but we are going to, willy-nilly, apply it to other areas because the
other areas are important. So I think it would be political suicide to simply say we are
going to extend R2P. R2P remains very contentious. Just working it out vis-à-vis the four
crimes and their incitement is proving to be a generational effort. And it should be,
because of its importance. It is not going to happen overnight. But then you cannot just
extend it. There are many elements of R2P, which I think will come out today and
tomorrow, that tell us a lot, including the idea of setting up a commission and getting
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independent ideas, because member states are not going to come up with this kind of
thing. So that is not one way to go about it.
Now, the concept of cultural genocide has lots of problems. One of them is, whose
cultural genocide? Whose cultural heritage are we talking about? It is not just a question
of counterterrorism. It is not just a question of armed groups. It is not just the question of
groups that we call “terrorists.” And I am glad to finally mention the Uyghur issue. I think
it applies very well to what is happening to the Rohingya in Burma. So it would be nice to
say it is only about counterterrorism. It would be nice to say it is only about nasty groups
that everyone disagrees with. But I do not think that is the case. I think the truth is that
governments do this as well. Historically, our government has done it, the Soviet
government has done it, the Chinese government has done it, the Australian government
has done it, the Canadian government has done it; many governments have done it. As
part of the settler mentality and as part of the nation-building enterprise, the destruction
of other cultures, unfortunately, has been a part of history. There is nothing new about
this. I think Barbara Harff put it well when she called this “politicide.”
But it does seem to me that what we read about in the period 1946–48 was that many
governments, including Western governments, were extremely uncomfortable with the
notion of including cultural genocide under the Genocide Convention. The French, the
Americans, the Danes, the British, the Canadians, the Australians—you name it—all said,
“Oh, no, no, we’ll put that under human rights. We’ll get around to it under human rights.”
Of course, they did not get around to it under human rights. But it does seem to me that
those same countries resisted when indigenous people raised the question of cultural
genocide in the 1990s. The same countries were against including that language in the
1990s that were against it in the 1940s. And many of those are the same countries that
would love to say this is only about counterterrorism, who would love to say this is only
about non-state actors. But unfortunately, it is not just about non-state actors, and it is not
just about terrorism. It is about a political project, whoever is carrying it out, that wants to
identify certain cultures as inferior to others, as getting in the way in the larger nation-
building project. So if we fool ourselves into thinking this is going to be politically easy or
everyone is coming together on the same page, I just do not think that is true. There is
going to be resistance, and I think we have to recognize that.
And that, to me, is why building the conceptual umbrella or conceptual framework is
especially important. This may be adding difficulty or obstacles to this project, but I do this
because I think the project is extremely important. We have to be very careful that we do
not take the path of least resistance.
JENNIFER WELSH It is always difficult to speak after Simon and Ed and say anything
fresh. But I want to start with a different example from the one discussed over the last day.
And that is the specter of the burning of Notre-Dame Cathedral. Of course, it is not an
example of destruction during armed conflict, but it is an example of an important global
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monument falling before our very eyes. Now, I think that is important to keep in the
background, because, of course, it is easy for all of us, particularly those of us who are
academics, to tell you how ambitious and complicated this initiative is going to be. And I
think others, over the next day and a half, are going to speak about how any such program
needs to consider what it means to have it led by Western states and about the various
strands of effort required. I just want to talk about two contextual elements that I think
will shape the efforts: the changing character of conflict and the contemporary
geopolitical and normative environment.
The first—and this is obvious but important to state—is that R2P was designed as a
political and not a legal principle. It was not designed to create new law but to enhance
compliance with existing law. Kofi Annan once said, “We have all the law we need. That’s
not our problem. Our problem is compliance with existing law.” So, as a political principle,
I think how you feel about R2P to a certain extent has to do with how much you think
political principles matter. If you do not think they matter, then you do not think it is
particularly powerful. But if you do, I think you can isolate at least three rules of a political
principle. The first is mobilizing the will to act, the second is raising the political cost of
inaction, and the third concerns political principles that can build institutional capacity.
The R2P agenda, among other things, has built incredible institutional capacity at the local,
national, regional, and international levels and in academia. So that may be something to
think about if this framework is partly political: how to expressly think about those three
roles of a political principle or framework.
Second, the shape and the meaning of R2P have evolved over time. It is a living and
breathing principle. And partly because it is quite open-ended, it is about bringing about a
state of affairs; it is not about prescribing particular actions. That has always been a
criticism. So it has been contested. And again, one can see that as a weakness or a strength.
Let me just elaborate a bit on the context for thinking about this effort in contemporary
international relations. First I want to talk about the changing nature of armed conflict.
The first point I want to make, from the perspective of the protection of human beings, is
that armed conflict is not the primary source of violent death and destruction globally for
human beings. The majority of states most affected by lethal violence today are not
formally at war. And the levels of lethal violence in some conflict settings are higher than
in war zones. So if you look at the Global Burden of Armed Violence Study of 2015, it
shows that, on average, just over half a million people die annually in violent
circumstances. Only 15 percent of those die in formal armed conflict settings. The
remainder die in non-war settings, what the ICRC sometimes calls situations other than
war. So while some of the most violent countries in the world—Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan,
South Sudan, Pakistan—are war zones, some Latin American and Caribbean countries that
are not at war are more dangerous places to live. Other countries with high levels of lethal
violence—Brazil and Mexico—are not in a state of formal armed conflict. Yet it is also true
that much of this violence is not random; it is organized and, in some cases, political.
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The second point is that committing crimes against humanity, or genocide, does not
require the context of an armed conflict. Many of you know this, but I think it is important
to reiterate. Think of the genocide in Cambodia and the ethnic cleansing in Myanmar.
These were and are not instances of formal armed conflict. So in a sense, that was the
strength of the Responsibility to Protect: it covered issues of protection, both when you
have a formal armed conflict and when you do not. And this changes the institutional
framework, the legal framework we think in. Although the vast majority of countries in
the world live in a zone of peace, the remaining 20 percent are experiencing lethal,
predominantly civil, conflict, where there are indiscriminate attacks on civilians,
annihilation of minorities, starvation of populations. And these are part of the strategic
repertoire of belligerence. They are not something that happens in the fog of war; they are
deliberate.
What are the key changes with respect to the conduct of war? Let me briefly spell out
four. As has been mentioned, the rise of intrastate or civil war. I think it is also worth
noting that civil wars, on average, are lasting longer, many of them for more than twenty
years, and many of them are very hard to bring to resolution through some of our
traditional tools, whether we are thinking of mediation or peacekeeping forces, as the
Democratic Republic of Congo shows. The urbanization of warfare has been mentioned,
even the return to the old military strategy of the siege, as we saw with Aleppo. And again,
just think, international humanitarian law (IHL) does not, in and of itself, prohibit sieges.
It tries to make them less lethal for civilians, but it does not prohibit them outright. So we
are seeing a return to that mode of warfare, as well as aerial bombardment of urban
centers, both as a strategic tool and as a tactical tool. Third—and I think this is
important—is the internationalization of civil wars and the use of local proxies by outside
powers. At least a third of all civil wars are now internationalized. Sometimes you see
those proxy relationships acting as a force of restraint, but at other times they can fuel and
enhance the capabilities of local proxies. It can be very difficult to locate responsibility in
that dynamic relationship. Some analysts are now talking about the phenomenon of
hybrid wars—Yemen, Iraq, Ukraine—which involve irregular forces on the ground backed
by the sophisticated capabilities of regional or global partners. And, again, that
hybridization makes it harder to ensure accountability.
Concerning changes in the nature of combatants, I want to come back to Ed’s point
about non-state armed groups not being the only culprits. I found this assumption
something we need to challenge. Over and over again when I worked in the UN system, I
was told that the problem with respect to atrocity crimes was the nasty non-state armed
groups. But as my ICRC friends always reminded me, states are still the biggest
perpetrators of atrocity crimes against populations. And of course, we have seen a real
proliferation in the number of groups. The ICRC has noted that more non-state armed
groups have arisen in the past six or seven years than in the past six or seven decades. So
when we think about non-state armed groups and how this initiative might come to grips
CULTURAL HERITAGE UNDER SIEGE 17
with those, it is really important to unpack this category and acknowledge the wide array
of actors we are talking about, because the differences among them affect not only how
they behave but also how one might counteract their threats to populations and
infrastructure and cultural heritage.
I think we could broadly conceive of five axes of differentiation. The first is objectives.
Those can range from pushing for government reform (the FARC in Colombia or the old
LTTE in Sri Lanka) to regime overthrow (the Houthis in Yemen) to the creation of a new
territorial and political order, in the case of Da’esh. The more concrete the political
objective, the more likely the group is to engage with the process of negotiation if that will
help them achieve their goal. Conversely, the lack of that political objective can frustrate
engagement and often change the nature of the violence used.
The second axis is organizational type. Some of these non-state armed groups have
statelike features, clear chains of command, and a leadership that exercises control. And
many of the anticolonial and secessionist movements organized themselves in a
hierarchical fashion precisely to show that they were like sovereign states and had those
attributes. But many non-state armed groups are divided into competing factions with
very ambiguous lines of command. And in fact, some of them consciously embrace
fragmentation as a strategy for survival, relying on loosely allied, self-managing units.
The presence and strength of ideology is a third differentiating factor. Ideologies both
inform agendas and justify the ways these groups operate. Now, interestingly, some
ideologies do not justify or support attacks on civilian populations or infrastructure and
might even serve to restrain these groups. But for violent extremists, ideologies construct
threats, they attribute guilt, they serve as a justification for targeting and extermination.
Some of the literature on R2P calls this an atrocity-justifying ideology, which provides a
very powerful resource for recruitment, let alone for engagement in violence.
Turning to the fourth axis, the strategies and tactics of non-state armed groups also
vary widely. Some consciously attempt to adhere to principles of IHL, for example, those
that have signed deeds of commitment with Geneva Call, the NGO that works with non-
state armed groups. At the other extreme, ISIS actually takes pleasure in flouting
international legal obligations.
The fifth and final axis along which these groups are distributed is the nature of the
relationship to territory and the civilian population. For those who are engaged in self-
determination struggles, the claim to particular territory and international recognition of
that claim are really important. Others draw their support from a particular sector of the
community and try to deepen that support by providing social services and other
governance functions. By contrast, groups like the Lord’s Resistance Army do not attempt
to hold territory or provide services to civilians, making them less susceptible to
traditional forms of pressure. And of course, ISIS is even harder to categorize, as at one
point it had territorial control but now is much more diffuse.
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So the conclusion to be drawn from this very brief survey is that “non-state armed
group” is a very broad umbrella term. This project needs to engage very directly with that
reality and think through the different contexts in which we are talking about those who
destroy not just communities of people, but cultural heritage. And we also need to pay
attention to their patterns of violence.
But the other point I want to make is that non-state armed groups do not operate in a
legal vacuum. They are bound by a considerable range of relevant obligations under
international humanitarian law, and individual members of those groups can be subject to
international criminal law. So that is important for us to keep in mind. In addition, while
international human rights law is relatively limited with respect to non-state armed
groups, given that it is focused on obligations of states, developments in international
criminal law, particularly the broadening of the scope of crimes against humanity and war
crimes, have created possibilities for establishing responsibility for members of non-state
armed groups. That is another important contextual factor. But if we think less about law
and more about political imperatives, I think there is also the potential to think more
expansively about the responsibilities of non-state armed groups. States generally retain
the primary responsibility to protect populations, but to protect cultural heritage, non-
state actors that exert effective control can also be said to have political responsibilities if
not legal ones.
Now of course, skeptics of this approach will probably argue that if you attribute
responsibilities to them, then you are legitimizing them, you are giving them statelike
attributes, and you need to be concerned about that. But I do not think that that is
necessarily so. We can see that through the work of Geneva Call, which strikes a very
delicate balance between engaging with non-state armed groups and not claiming that this
legitimizes them.
As my last point here before I turn to the geopolitical context, I want to reiterate that
the culprits in the erosion of respect for international humanitarian law are not only non-
state armed groups. Nation-states themselves, either directly or through their support for
allies, are contributing to the erosion of the international humanitarian order. Warring
parties have driven a bulldozer through the openings in IHL, in order to roll back their
obligations to protect civilians. And this is not only the case with actors such as the
president of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, but also some liberal democracies when they are at
war. I think it is very important to keep this in mind as we go forward with this initiative.
Now, all of these cases of violations of the laws of war are creating a gap between the
public’s knowledge and expectation of IHL, which is at an all-time high, and the reality of
compliance. One of the legal advisers to the ICRC, Helen Durham, has warned that we
need to ensure that this gap does not develop into a vicious cycle in which not respecting
the law becomes the new normal. And perhaps this can be part of what we do in this
initiative, in terms of thinking about the law that protects cultural property.
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So, second and finally, let me make some comments about the geopolitical context in
which we are working. Both Ed Luck and Simon Adams have talked about competition
between major powers, which is very different from the context in which the
Responsibility to Protect arose. We had continuing forms of competition at that time, but
today that competition is strategic. As we hear every day in the trade war between the
United States and China, it is economic, and increasingly, it is becoming political. There are
still those, like Francis Fukuyama, who claim that there is no alternative to the liberal
democratic ideology in the world today; but we are seeing competition over ways of life at
a Great Power level that I think is important. There is lack of political space within the UN
Security Council for a thematic agenda generally. Let me give you one example. One of the
outputs of the normative steps that were taken in the early 1990s was a Protection of
Civilians report by the Secretary-General. Every twelve to eighteen months, the Security
Council would read a report. Three or four years ago, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) could not find a state to table that report. The Western states
on the council said, “We simply do not have the political capital to spend on thematic
issues. All we can do is try to reach agreement on particular country situations.” And for
me, that was an incredibly powerful demonstration of where we are.
There has also been an infection of all issues with this geopolitical dynamic. I don’t
know if Simon would agree with me, but whereas four or five years ago you could insulate
the Central African Republic and Burundi, to separate these cases from the broader
geopolitical dynamic, today it is becoming harder and harder to do that. And I think the
conversations on Venezuela that have happened in the Security Council reveal just how
every place on the globe is now being seen as a place for these struggles.
Two last points. First, peacekeeping missions themselves are under enormous strain. So
I read with interest Simon’s focus on adding to the mandate of the mission in Mali an
element of respect for cultural property. But there are huge demands on peacekeeping
operations today. And their mandates are often not implemented, despite what the
Security Council will say. So despite the fact we have had a mandate to protect civilians,
including through the use of force by peacekeeping missions, that mandate has often not
been fulfilled. The missions on the ground do not fulfill it, for various reasons. And so
when you think about adding more tasks to the agenda of peacekeeping operations, we
have to think through the realities of implementation, which often lie with troop-
contributing countries.
Second, I think there has been a problematic focus, at least within Western states, on
upholding what they call the “liberal international order.” That multilateralism today is
under attack, they say, and how we must respond is by buttressing the liberal
international order, which, it is claimed, IHL and other instruments are part of. I think this
is a very dangerous strategy in the world that we live in. I think the future is about talking
to a variety of states about a rules-based international order, not the liberal international
order, not the rules-based order, because we are moving into a world in which we have to
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be open to the reform of that system. As I saw continuously when I was working in my
mandate on R2P, you cannot separate states’ positions on issues like protection from their
views on the legitimacy of the multilateral order, of the composition of the Security
Council, of the way that our rules-based system works. We may say, “Well, they shouldn’t
bring those political concerns into this discussion,” but they do. And so I think that is an
important backdrop, also, for the work that you are doing.
PAUL H. WISE I work in what has been called “human security,” a humanitarian response
to violent conflict—protection of civilians and response to their needs when protection
fails. I was part of a small group evaluating civilian casualties and response in the Battle of
Mosul, and I have been working in the Northern Triangle of Central America, which, after
Syria, has the highest violent death rates in the world. One of the striking things I have
learned about the issue of protecting cultural heritage is that the claim to legitimacy for
cultural heritage protection is based on the inseparability of the protection for cultural
heritage and human security. That comes up in virtually every comment that has been
made. It also is central to the writings that try to elevate the requirements for protecting
cultural heritage in a more general political environment. I believe in the inseparability.
However, I just finished a paper months in the works, with Jennifer, for which I reviewed
hundreds of articles and reports on humanitarian response to violent conflict, and almost
none said anything about the protection of cultural heritage. The ones that did approached
cultural heritage strictly within a counterterrorism framework: financing of insurgency
and using illicit economies as financing tools. So I am confronted by a very stark
contradiction, or paradox: the central claim to legitimacy coming out of the cultural
heritage world and the complete ignoring of that claim by the humanitarian or human
security world, which seems essential to the position and the hope of protecting cultural
heritage.
My question is, would it be useful to confront this dilemma, this contradiction, this
paradox, head-on, in a way that could help bridge these two arenas of concern, which I
believe are clearly linked? But certainly in the humanitarian world, that is not a central
concern. The way that the issue is often posed is saving lives versus saving stones. And of
course, that is a condescending way that physicians and humanitarian medical types,
humanitarians, view the issue. It may be linked at some level, but this linkage is elastic. It
is deformed by a hierarchy of atrocities that elevates bombing civilians and bombing
cultural heritage, objects of cultural importance. Let’s look at what is inseparable, what is
elastic, and what is not.
First is the issue of destruction of cultural heritage as prelude to the destruction of
people—that it is a foreshadowing. It is the Heine quote that there is a connection that is
central. We all know and have heard examples of this foreshadowing of this connection.
However, it is an empirical question. It is not theoretical. What portion of all the atrocities
against people or organized violent attacks on people are foreshadowed by attacks on
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cultural objects? That is an empirical question. There are databases where we could look
at that. Now, again, we have enough evidence, going back to Kristallnacht, that shows us
that there is a connection. But for humanitarians, it is not only that there is a connection,
but there is the condition of frequency of those connections that is important. It may be
that every time you damage or destroy a synagogue or a cultural object, it will lead to
threatening, hurting, or killing people. But what portion of attacks on humans are
foreshadowed by going after objects? It may be 5 percent of the time. And for
humanitarians who are totally preoccupied by saving lives and going out and avoiding
bombs and bullets to do surgery, it makes a big difference that these conditional
frequencies are critical in a very pragmatic way.
It also comes up with the discussion of Lemkin and the integration of cultural
considerations into notions of genocide. I buy it. I think everybody would buy it. But the
vast majority of violent attacks and organized violence on people are not genocidal in
nature, by anybody’s definition. And therefore, you get these disconnects between the
reality of what people are facing in the humanitarian world and what is being discussed
for a genocide framing that certainly, tragically, does occur but may not characterize the
majority of conflicts where humanitarians are active. Counterterrorism has been
mentioned. But it is the singular thing that does come up in the humanitarian world
because of the finance and the illicit economy support, if not for the origins of these
insurgencies, then for the maintenance of them, where criminal activity is blended with
ideology in ways that the traditional dichotomy between grievance and greed is
completely eradicated; these are really one and the same. The issue of coming back to the
security lens becomes the area that I feel is the most compelling linkage, bringing the issue
of cultural heritage more directly into the center of humanitarian theory, humanitarian
response in the real world. It comes out as a form of destabilizing local security. It breaks
the social fabric of communities. But this is not well developed in the humanitarian world,
or precisely for the humanitarian world. It is also necessary to understand that mental
health questions, questions of the impact of war on the mental health of individuals and
the collective mental health of communities, has been traditionally undervalued in the
humanitarian world. Only recently have mental health issues been elevated to be almost
as important as surgery to deal with trauma associated with blast injury—that the
psychological trauma becomes critically important in the claims to legitimacy of cultural
heritage. And yet it begins to erode by the time it is translated into a humanitarian arena.
In some ways, in the humanitarian world, people are talking about resilience, individual
resilience, in terms of the long-term effect of violent conflict, and community resilience. By
destroying cultural heritage, in many ways we are destroying the fabric of resilience in
these communities or for these individuals in ways that have not been adequately
addressed. I focus a lot on what is called the indirect effects of war. I do worry about the
direct effects—being exposed to bombs and bullets. I am a clinician and work on those
issues. But when you destroy the essentials of life—food, water, shelter—you have these
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reverberating effects that go on for years and almost always far surpass the direct effects
from bombs and bullets in terms of mortality. And this arena becomes very important for
understanding the impact of cultural heritage. It is underdeveloped, in the cultural
heritage world but also in the humanitarian world, and has, I think, enormous promise as
a way to begin to integrate the two fields.
Humanitarian types like to think of themselves as risk-takers, going out and avoiding
roadblocks and risking our lives to save people, while the cultural heritage people are in
museums and sitting around seminar tables. Now, this is terribly unfair, particularly when
you look at what happened in Palmyra, with curators who are giving their lives to protect
cultural heritage. But there is a kind of cultural bias that also creates obstacles. And these
are barriers that should not be there and will need to be overcome at some level: it is not a
question of saving stones; it is a question of saving touchstones to the human psyche. They
are touchstones to, in some ways, the human heart. That speaks to the humanitarian
world and what humanitarians care about, what doctors care about; but it has not been
addressed with that kind of language, that kind of power, that kind of empirical evidence
that I think could be useful.
I am not willing to disassociate yet between the humanitarians and the cultural
heritage people. It may be that we need multiple strategies working in parallel. But I have
seen the impact of the destruction of cultural objects and heritage on people’s ability to
persist in a very contentious world, and people’s well-being, so that I am convinced that
this may, in fact, be a very efficient way of addressing, ultimately, mortality and well-
being, if we can explore those things.
I work a lot with Mayan communities in Guatemala. And their whole history has been
one of cultural destruction. Yet they still hold on and value in ways that provide a social
fabric that is essential to their well-being and willingness to continue to struggle against
remarkable obstacles and oppression. So I welcome the comment, because it focuses,
perhaps, attention on what we will need to do, and perhaps what I will need to do in my
contribution here, to address these issues in a more focused way.
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2
CULTURAL HERITAGE AT RISK
LUIS MONREAL I am going to talk about urban heritage at risk in zones of armed conflict.
As you know, in our institution, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC), we have some
experience working in postwar situations. So what I am going to tell you is based on
experience, institutional experience. We started working in Afghanistan three weeks after
the fall of the Taliban regime. And we know that in the urban context, the most important
thing when you want to restore the urban and social context is to respond to the people’s
need. We have worked in Afghanistan, in Kabul and Herat, and I have four hundred
people still working there. But in this region we are considering, we have some of the
longest-inhabited cities, like Aleppo, which claims to be the longest continuously inhabited
city in the world. It is also a very high-risk situation. We cannot predict, in the next
twenty-five years, what is going to happen from the Middle East to the Maghreb al-Aqsa
and places where there are some of the most important cities for certain civilizations.
Urban cultural heritage conservation is important because it is socially relevant. It is
no longer an exercise in preserving the social fabric as if it comprised museum pieces.
Rather, it is a living context, an economic asset for future generations. Because all of these
cities, by maintaining a living culture, are assets for future generations. The
reconstruction of these cities, in our experience, is important because it is the basis for
restoring economic production, it is the basis for restoring commerce, and it is the
framework for life, for quality of life. I think this is extremely important. In a postwar
situation, you need to rehabilitate with the aspiration to create better conditions than
those that existed before.
Since 2001, we have been working in one large area of Cairo, the [al-]Darb al-Ahmar
area. The people there now have bathrooms with running water, something they did not
have before. Urban rehabilitation is based on responding to the basic needs of people. And
it demonstrates, as I said before, how futile, how absurd, it is to discuss what comes first.
Nothing comes first. These people constitute the living context.
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We decided two years ago that we were going to go into Syria and start working in
Aleppo. We are a Swiss entity, legally, so we went to Bern to discuss our ambitions with the
Swiss authorities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We wanted to know if we would fall
under sanctions if we went to work in Syria. The director-general was very surprised.
“Why did you come here? Obviously, you are doing humanitarian work. You don’t need to
consult with us,” he said. “But beware of the banks. The banks are not going to consider
you as a humanitarian organization, and you are going to have all sorts of problems.”
Working in historic cities is about more than restoring monuments. It requires us to
deal with the urban fabric, with infrastructure, with facilities and services. And, of course,
we cannot work, necessarily, with all the punctilious principles of certain conventions. Let
me find a metaphor. It is like operating in a war hospital. You need to do things quickly,
save lives if you can. You cannot work as a private entity. You need to work on the basis of
public-private partnership agreements. So you need to make agreements with the national
authorities and with the local authorities. And to be successful, you need to bring in the
local population. Even in these postwar situations, local populations never think that an
entity, a foreign entity, arrives with good intentions. You need to prove your good
intentions. We developed a very simple system. The first things you need to rebuild are the
toilets and the sanitation infrastructure. Then it is essential exhaustively to document the
condition of the city. This will give us a sense of the destruction. It will also allow us to
rather precisely estimate the total reconstruction of the city, at current cost. You know that
the World Bank has made some estimates of how much it will cost to reconstruct Aleppo,
but our estimates are completely different from those of the World Bank because they are
based on real knowledge of the situation. For instance, inflation is going to be a very
important factor in Syria in the next couple of years; but at the moment, with less than
$100 million, you could do significant work to restore three areas of the old city, which are
the priorities that we have established for this rehabilitation project. As you will see, the
first thing, of course, is how you create competence. So the first thing was to create, with
Irina Bokova’s support—at the time she was with UNESCO—a training course for stone
masons. In fact, there were two courses. We did that at the citadel. This on-site training
allows us to rebuild the things that were destroyed at the citadel.
We chose to start with the Souq al-Saqatiya, which is the area in this zone. We chose the
Souq al-Saqatiya in this condition because there were 11,000 families that depend on its
economy. If you translate that into individuals, the number is between 60,000 and 70,000
people who depend on the economy that takes place in the souq. We have calculated that
the reconstruction of the souq will bring annually a new influx of approximately $35
million to the economy of the city. You need to keep these operations very simple because
you are going to work not only with your own people; you are going to engage contractors,
as we have done. We will have to work with the government, the people from the public
services, to deal with utilities, water, electricity.
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Then, of course, you need to work with the community to explain what the final result
will be. They are the stakeholders. And it is also important because part of the deal is that
the merchants themselves will pay for or work on the rehabilitation of the inside of their
shops. This is not free coffee for everybody. In some areas, we found significant structural
damage. But I must confess that because of the need to show quick results, we chose a
segment of the souq in which the structural damage was not too severe. So immediately
we can provide an image of hope and things rebuilt. Some of the areas already have been
paved, painted, and cleaned. And finally, of course, work started on the roofs. I invite all of
you to come to the opening ceremony on July 15.
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3
MILITARY PERSPECTIVES AND
COSTS: WAR, OCCUPATION, AND
INTERVENTION
SCOTT SAGAN I was pleased to hear mention of the work of two of my former students,
Jake Shapiro and Joseph Felter. Joe now is the deputy assistant secretary of defense; he
was drafted into that position by Jim Mattis. And Jake is now a tenured professor at
Princeton. What they studied, both in a book project and then in a chapter in a volume of
Daedalus that I edited, was the idea of courageous restraint. Courageous restraint was the
idea of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who said that we are killing too many civilians in
Afghanistan. And that is understandable, because a soldier comes under duress. Soldiers
are facing fire from somewhere, and they will call in air support as quickly as possible. Or
they will call for an artillery barrage. And yet, ultimately, if we are killing a lot of civilians,
we are going to lose this war. So he hired a young Stanford PhD, Joe Felter, to study what
could happen if you reduce collateral damage. He had this idea that we could actually
incentivize soldiers to take some personal risk in order to avoid killing civilians. This was
a very controversial decision. He actually gave, not medals, but little certificates to soldiers
if they personally took risks. Because the Geneva Convention, in article 57 of the
Additional Protocol, calls for taking all feasible precautions to avoid civilian death as
collateral damage. We have been mostly talking about cultural heritage damage as a
deliberate act by people, but it is also often collateral damage. How can we discourage
people from engaging in acts that cause damage, say, if there is a sniper in a mosque? This
idea of courageous restraint could do so. What was so brilliant about the article cited in
our paper was the argument that you should limit civilian casualties not just because it is
the right thing to do ethically, not just because it is the law, but because it will help you
win.
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I want to report very quickly on a study that Ben Valentino at Dartmouth and I did that
tried to get at the question, would the public support U.S. troops taking risks to avoid
killing foreign civilians? We had a representative sample of the American public read a
story that argues that the United States has a very strong incentive to attack a chemical
storage site in an Afghan village and could use Special Forces to go door to door until they
found out exactly where it is. In this experiment there will be no Afghan civilian fatalities,
but there will be five American soldiers estimated to be killed. The alternative is to have
an artillery strike that will not kill any Americans but will kill two hundred Afghans. And
then we polled a representative sample of the public on what they would prefer.
We varied the number of Americans killed to find out if people would support a Special
Forces operation if 5, 50, or 200, or even more American lives were lost to save that
number of civilian lives. Here are the results. What was interesting in this finding, which
was published in International Studies Quarterly last year, what we called the “due care”
experiment after one of the references to the principle of precaution, is that just half, just
over 50 percent, of Americans said that they would be willing to risk 5 lives in order to
avoid killing 200 Afghan civilians. They would be willing to protect civilians but only at
limited cost to Americans. When asked, “Was this ethical?,” a significant number of people
said, “Well, I would do it, but I don’t think it’s really ethical.” So they had a sense that it
was wrong to kill 200 people to save 5 Americans, but they would be willing to do it
anyway. Could you do this kind of experiment with a sniper-in-a-mosque scenario and
have people try to figure out if it is worth risking troops to avoid killing and destroying
cultural heritage? I think you could. I do not know what the answer would be, and I do not
know if it would be different in different countries. But what I do believe is that you could
change the conversation to saying, “You’re taking this risk to produce a better peace when
this is all over, because cultural heritage is really important after wars, not just before
wars or during wars.” If so, you would get a positive response.
HELEN FROWE I am a philosopher, and I specialize in the ethics of self-defense and
harming. At the moment, Derek [Matravers] and I are running a project called Heritage in
War, which is funded by the British government. One of the central goals of the project is
to try to understand how the value of cultural heritage compares to the other values that
are at stake in war. In particular, we are interested in how the harm to the heritage should
be weighed against harms to life and limb. Unless we can weigh these harms, it seems like
we cannot really have any principled way of resolving conflicts between them. And in our
view, these kinds of conflicts between heritage and people are common.
It is quite common in the heritage field for people to deny that you can have these
kinds of conflicts between people and heritage and also to deny that you can compare
these kinds of values. For example, Tom Weiss and Nina Connelly write in their Occasional
Paper, “People and culture are inseparable. There is no need for a hierarchy of protection
because the choice between the two is false, just as the choice between people and the
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natural environment is false. Air, water, and culture are essential for life.” This is a quote
from the website of the U.K. Committee of the Blue Shield: “The Hague Convention does
not place cultural property above people, as it exists within a wider framework of laws
designed to protect civilians and their property in a conflict situation.” This is from Irina
Bokova: “There is no need to choose between saving lives and preserving cultural
heritage. The two are inseparable.” And this is a quote we had in our funding application
for the project, from an anonymous reviewer: “These research issues have not been
addressed within just war theories in part because weighing the value of human life
against cultural property is not deemed an appropriate question within this area of
research. The suggested comparison of the value of cultural property with the value of
human life as something to be investigated strikes me as deeply problematic.” So this
should have given us some warning about what we were in for.
Here are some conflicts that seem to challenge the inseparability thesis. If we just start
with the Hague Convention, it requires combatants to refrain from any use of cultural
property or its immediate surroundings in support of military action. Now, insofar as
combatants would have otherwise used a site, presumably they would have done so
because it afforded them some kind of military advantage. So to prohibit their use of the
site and tell them to use another site that otherwise they would not have chosen is to
require combatants to operate at increased risk to themselves for the sake of heritage. The
Hague Convention, for example, demands that combatants do, that they take on
risks—that is, risks to their lives—for the sake of protecting heritage. Article 12 also
implies that combatants can be required to impose greater risks on civilians in order to
avoid damaging heritage. So again, even if making use of a cultural site would, for
example, draw fire away from a civilian population, it requires that they not use the site.
The alternative imposes comparatively increased risks on civilians. So the question here is
not whether we think it is permissible to ask combatants to do these things. This is just a
conceptual point about the fact that protecting heritage can come at the cost of increased
risk to people. It is a separate question from what we ought to do. It simply shows that it is
not the case that protecting heritage cannot conflict with protecting people.
Finally, an obvious way in which we have a conflict between people and heritage is, as
Tom and Nina propose in their paper, if we deployed combatants in order to protect
heritage. This would clearly be a case of imposing risks on our combatants or asking them
to incur risks in order to defend heritage. And yet Tom and Nina say that attempting to
establish a hierarchy for protecting people and heritage is counterproductive. What I want
to suggest, actually, is that it is essential.
I want to look a bit more closely at this proposal that Tom and Nina have made—that
we ought to consider having heritage as a just cause for force. And this is the view that
they develop in the paper for the Getty series, in which they suggest that we need to
develop a framework that parallels the R2P doctrine. They explicitly say that this includes
the use of military force to defend heritage. This is heritage for its own sake. This is not a
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claim that you can only use force in order, say, to prevent genocide, that you should
intervene to defend heritage when it will prevent genocide or other very serious harms to
people. It is a claim that is distinctive, namely that it is permissible to use force to defend
heritage for itself.
Military intervention typically involves imposing serious harms or serious risks of
harm such as death. And so the question that is really before us, if we are going to take
this kind of proposal seriously, is whether it is permissible to kill or impose high risks of
killing people for the sake of defending heritage. Now, Tom and Nina think that we can
answer this question without needing to compare harms to humans with harms to
heritage. Heritage and people are the same thing. Heritage and people are inseparable.
Heritage or people is a false dichotomy. One implication of this is that whatever is justified
to defend people’s lives is, therefore, justified to defend heritage because they are the
same thing.
This is clearly a mistaken way of reasoning. The fact that defending heritage sometimes
protects life, and that we can use lethal force in those cases, does not mean that heritage
itself warrants lethal defense. Nor, I think, does it mean that defending heritage always
saves lives.
The proposal that we might use force to defend heritage requires showing that
defending heritage is sometimes more important than not killing people. That is just what
the proposal is. So I do not see how you could show this without having some kind of
ranking of harms to humans and harms to heritage. I just want to sketch very briefly here
a kind of very basic case you would need to make in order to justify the use of military
force. You need to show specifically that it is permissible to intentionally harm somebody
to prevent them from damaging heritage. We need to show that it is permissible to
foreseeably harm somebody as a side effect of preventing damage to heritage. Essentially,
what you need to show is that the intentional harms that you would impose during the
intervention would be permissible but also that your collateral damage is permissible as
well, because it is pretty much impossible to wage a military campaign without risking
collateral damage to civilians.
Now, supporting either of these claims requires an account of how to compare harms
to people to damage to heritage. And this is just for the straightforward reason that force
is only ever permissible if it is proportionate. This is the standard constraint on the use of
force. It must be necessary and proportionate. And proportionality just is a comparison of
the harms at stake. Now, proportionality, in turn, demands that we have some way,
therefore, of assessing the value of heritage sites, because we need to know what is going
into the calculation that we then weigh against the other goods that are at stake.
So unless you can show, by way of comparing harms, that protecting heritage warrants
both killing wrongdoers—people who are targeting heritage—and imposing significant
risks of killing bystanders, I do not see how one could support the permissibility of
forcefully intervening for the sake of heritage.
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BENJAMIN ISAKHAN I have been doing a pilot study, the very first, I think, of this precise
problem. How do the people in these conflict contexts view what is going on? I am going to
present some very preliminary observations that come out of this set of data. We have
done fifty in-depth, semistructured interviews. They represent a broad geographic spread
from across both Iraq and Syria and, of course, different ethnic and religious groups, as
well as gender. We strived for gender balance, but in the end we did not manage, so far at
least in the interviews, to get complete balance; but we have some representation of both
genders. So, obviously, with these kinds of qualitative interviews, we have gotten an
enormous amount of data that I simply do not have time to go into. Much of the data deal
with their experiences of the Islamic State, of having been eyewitnesses to moments of
heritage destruction, their own very personal stories of trauma, their memories, and so
on. But what I want to focus on is the small portion that comes out of that data set in
which they talk about how they perceive what the international community ought to do in
response to this heritage destruction.
So let me run through a handful of quotes. Again, I have just plucked them out of a
very, very broad data set.
And I think that this is a very interesting quote:
So again, I think in engaging in the region, in terms of heritage protection, we have to
be really cognizant, really sensitive, about where we are engaging, who we are engaging,
The international community just shouldn’t get involved in our heritage. We don’t want
you here. Iraqis can do it. We have the money, we have the knowledge, we have the
experience. We don’t need any help. We don’t want anyone reconstructing anything.
The international community didn’t do anything for people or for heritage.
The international community, unfortunately, failed in really fulfilling its responsibility
toward the whole of humanity and history. The international community failed to
safeguard the culture in Yemen, failed to preserve culture in Palmyra, failed in
protecting the heritage in Afghanistan.
This will return really negative outcomes and impacts for the international society,
because people who have lost everything have nothing to live for, and therefore, they
are not going to work toward social cohesion into the future.
As long as there’s conflict, there’s going to be destruction of sites, unless you deploy UN
forces just to those sites. But then what are you saying to the people? People can die.
That’s okay, as long as you don’t destroy heritage? That’s awful. The message that
you’re sending is that these heritage sites are much more important than lives or
hospitals or schools that are being destroyed.
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and the fact that we are not perceived to be privileging heritage over human life, because
that will only create resentment. And arguably, it might create more threats to the heritage
sites because you have a population that resents things being rebuilt.
Another point that sometimes flies in the face of consensus in the West, which came
out quite strongly, was that some people really wanted religious sites to be restored, their
own local religious sites, over archaeological ruins. One person said, “I don’t think we can
rebuild the archaeological sites like Hatra or Nimrud. Perhaps we can gather the pieces
destroyed and build a museum at each site, telling the stories of these sites and the way
they were destroyed. This can be done through cooperation between international
organizations and the local communities.” But then this person goes on to say, “But all
heritage sites of Yazidis and Christians, they should be rebuilt. They should be the focus.
All mosques should be rebuilt. We need to build a society where each ethnic and religious
community’s heritage sites and traditions are respected and embraced.” So people thought
that that was much more important than the overwhelming emphasis on archaeology and
ancient archaeological sites.
Another thing that came up was the politics of who pays for the reconstruction of
heritage sites. This was a very sensitive issue. Specifically, people talked about the UAE
and backing the UNESCO Revive the Spirit of Mosul project. So I refer to one quote that
reflects on that:
So I think that is also very important when we are talking about the ethics of who
funds reconstruction projects.
This brings us to the final quote that I want to discuss today. And that is the idea that
for some people heritage just simply is not a priority and that they are very concerned
about the global effort and the global concern and the global outrage over heritage when
there are so many other priorities in their lives and in their own day-to-day existence.
The reconstruction of al-Nuri Mosque is just politics. The UAE wants to fund it because
some of them are Wahabis, and they funded Da’esh to do all of this terrible destruction.
It is Wahabi ideology to kill Christians or Yazidis, and to destroy historical sites and
cultural sites. But now the Gulf countries are embarrassed by what Da’esh did. So now
the Gulf wants to pay some money to fix up the mess they made. I don’t want their
dirty money. I want them to leave us alone to live in peace.
I think it’s a strange idea to reconstruct places, for example the Mosque of al-Nuri and
the minaret. Perhaps in a few years, when Mosul is being rebuilt and people have
returned. But what about other cities? I’m from Kirkuk, and there is a huge need there.
We have tensions with Kurds and Arabs, we have sectarian violence, we have people
starving, we have ladies who have been raped, we have kids with no school. All they
have seen is violence and terror. Children raised on death and destruction. They need
help. Hospitals, schools, roads, psychology, jobs, food, water, electricity, education. We
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Again, I just want to be clear that I am not putting all these ideas out there because I agree
explicitly with all of them. But to have a meaningful impact in the region, we need to be
really cognizant of the diversity of opinions, even when these opinions are very difficult,
when they are divergent. Perhaps the only way that international efforts to protect and
restore heritage can have a meaningful long-term impact in the region is if we engage
with these different ideas, even when we do not like them. Failing to listen and to heed
these opinions ultimately undermines the broader mission to foster stability and promote
peace in the region.
THOMAS G. WEISS Before I open the floor to what is going to be, I’m sure, a spirited
discussion, I just want to pick up on a couple of things that I think link back to the project.
We have all been talking about the local populations, so Ben is forcing us to try to figure
out how to get our hands on that information. But from a macro point of view, I think we
have spent perhaps too much time thinking about heritage sites, World Heritage Sites. And
we clearly have in mind, also, cemeteries, churches, mosques, and so on, at a much more
mundane level. It is not just the most famous sites. One of the reasons that one organizes
such a meeting as this is to rethink some of the things that we have started with. And this
session certainly does that for me. I think what is perhaps the most beneficial way to
approach this topic is that both this morning and this afternoon, we are being asked to
specify the difference between the inherent value of heritage, however you want to
measure that, and the destruction of heritage as a trigger, a threshold, for something
worse, the destruction of life. And so there have been lots of suggestions, which I think we
will come back to tomorrow, about the intrinsic value to people as they move ahead and
try to rebuild their lives. Paul [Wise] talked about resilience. If you are going to turn a
page on a conflict, and you really care about the lives of the people there, there is a
resilience factor. And this is essential. Scott [Sagan] mentioned the rather consequentialist
notion that protecting heritage in Mali or elsewhere can be useful for militaries because,
in fact, it helps them pursue their tactical aims. And we have not really mentioned it,
except briefly this morning, Luis [Monreal], in terms of an investment down the line, after
one moves beyond conflict, as a way to generate employment and income. So there are a
whole series of things that need to have costs and benefits associated with them.
We also said this morning that the extrinsic value of heritage destruction is important,
as this is the best indicator, always, of worse things to come. And that, too, I think we need
to look at very closely. And the kind of number crunching you were pointing to this
morning, Paul, as to our intuitive notion that virtually in all the contemporary conflicts
this has been an integral part of what is going on in every conflict that we have mentioned
here today. But we need to put some numbers on that as well.
need hygiene and security and work. We don’t need an old minaret. It was useless
anyway. Heritage is just not a priority for us.
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ISMAIL SERAGELDIN I want to say, first of all, I really appreciate your presentation. But it
is inherent in something that we have always done in cost-benefit analysis. There is an
enormous resistance—political, cultural, otherwise—to put a dollar value on human life.
People don’t want to do it, although it exists in everything that we do, and we can calculate
this. I can sit down and calculate it for you and tell you that you value this life at a million
dollars, this one at $50,000, this one at $30,000. There is no consistency whatsoever.
Legislation is undertaken without ever looking at the question of the dollar value that you
are putting on a human life. For example, if you have an airplane and you say, “I can’t
have the single system; I want a redundant system,” what if the redundant system fails?
Do I put in place a third one? Well, why not a fourth one? Somewhere when you stop you
can calculate the implicit cost by the probability functions of human life. And then you can
compare it to other values as well, in cost-benefit calculations or value calculations. But
there is a cultural resistance, a political resistance, for people to say, “I am going to assign
a value.” So that is almost never discussed. But it does not mean that it is not right, just
that it is not discussed. But there are alternative ways of doing these calculations. And
tomorrow I will present some of that. Because we can calculate the intrinsic value of
heritage to people, both locally and outside of the country and internationally. We have
done that for the environment. And believe it or not, the methodology that we have done
has stood up in American courts, even when it took a billion dollars from Exxon. And I can
cite that as well.
JENNIFER WELSH I want to make two sets of comments that I hope will be helpful for
thinking about the project. One is on the use of military force for the protection of
heritage, as one very specific thing that Helen [Frowe] spoke about. And the other is the
notion of cultural heritage as part of peace building. So, on the first, the very specific point
about whether this project would want to continue to speak so directly about the use of
force for the protection of heritage, I think what was challenging about Helen’s
presentation is that so much of the discussion about the use of force in this realm is about
harm to civilians. And what Helen puts on the table is that we cannot think about cost
solely in terms of civilian cost. We also have to think about the cost we are placing on
combatants. That has been the big move in thinking about the ethics of war. But it was
also part of the debate on humanitarian intervention. Could you ask soldiers to intervene
for a humanitarian cause that was not a direct threat to the national security of their own
state? I think by elevating this notion of whether we need to be thinking about the lives of
combatants, it is a very challenging but important issue.
The other piece that comes out—and it is probably something that philosophers do not
like, but it is something that political scientists have to live with—is that it is one thing to
debate the rightness of whether or not you should do something; the second question is,
who does it? If I think back to the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect as a debate, the
initial stage was not so much about whether military force is legitimate. It was addressing
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the question of who would be the legitimate ones to use force. The debate that came out of
at least two presentations is that who acts to protect cultural heritage is an absolutely
critical question—the legitimacy of different actors. And philosophers, I think, would not
necessarily accept that that affects the intrinsic quality of an action itself, but it does in the
real world, in the political world. Maybe Helen and I would debate this, this question of
who acts. It is seen as more legitimate if one actor does it versus another actor—a Western
versus a non-Western actor—which I think is just a reality. It is something that has come
through really strongly from the discussion this afternoon.
Moreover, increasingly as we go through the day, I think this question of protection of
cultural heritage is also a forward way of thinking about what is required to sustain peace.
This is super important. And I say that partly pragmatically, in that if we look at the
direction of the United Nations system right now, the big theme that has wind behind it is
“sustaining peace.” How is it, in a world that will have armed conflict, that will have
destruction, that we can actually make peace more sustainable? And it has a prevention
function. So how do you get societies ready to be more cohesive and resilient? But it is also
a matter of afterward. And so increasingly, I am thinking that Paul [Wise]’s discussion this
morning, but also things that have come out already this afternoon, the association with
cultural heritage and peace building, is going to be positive. My bets are on that as a
potentially promising frame.
FROWE So I was not suggesting that anyone was saying that we ought to intentionally kill
civilians. My point was just, I think, the fairly uncontroversial point that you cannot wage
military intervention using force without thereby increasing the risk of collateral harm to
civilians. And as I also said, whatever you think we ought to do when there are these
conflicts between civilians’ lives and heritage, that is a separate question. My point is
simply that there can be these clashes. Jennifer, I think we disagree about what
philosophers think about authority.
WELSH I was painting it in too purist a way, perhaps.
FROWE I do think that there is a difference between what private actors and individuals
can do for the sake of heritage and what states can do. So I think this comes down to a
question. I actually think that states have more restrictive permissions in these cases. I
think that individuals and private organizations have greater latitude with what they do
with their resources, compared to states.
SAGAN I will just make one basic point, which is that it is important to consider very
carefully how you think about the principle of proportionality in the context of heritage. I
disagree with something that Helen said: “Well, proportionality is a way of different
harms.” Because I think of proportionality as a measure of the benefit, the military
advantage, of taking out a target compared to the negative quality of collateral damage.
And that is what you’re trying to weigh, right? And it cannot be disproportionate. The
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collateral damage cannot be more than the military benefit. So when you are talking
about, say, shooting a sniper in a mosque, in a minaret, then the question is, how
important is that sniper? How much damage is that sniper going to do versus the collateral
damage to the minaret? So that is one thing. But the second, if you are talking about the
act of protecting it, then I think you have to say, “Well, the protection is a military
advantage in itself.” And that is the interesting, novel way of thinking about this, which is
that it is important to protect the minaret or mosque because of its contributions to
postwar reconstruction or sustainability of peace afterward. And that is a different way of
doing it. You still have to take into account if protecting it will create a lot of collateral
damage. But that would be a different way of putting this goal in a different context, a
different framework.
MOUNIR BOUCHENAKI I was very much interested in the presentation of the philosopher
Benjamin Isakhan about the comparison of the value between cultural heritage and
human beings. My only fear is that in the middle of battle, when you are into the wars, I
do not think people have the time to make proper evaluations and the right decisions. And
this is how we see many of the crises in our life now, how many casualties were inflicted
on the population and, at the same time, on the cultural heritage.
One example during the first Gulf War was a bombing of a telecommunications
position near the Iraqi Museum. It had an effect on the museum because it stopped the
entire air-conditioning system. Even we, as UNESCO, were not allowed to go to Iraq
because it was embargoed and the UN in New York was telling us, “No. We receive only
humanitarian missions.” When finally I insisted that I should go to Baghdad, in September
1998, I saw termites eating the walls of the museum, not only the objects. So my only fear
is that, of course, we need to have proper education of the military—and we started doing
it with the Americans before the U.S. ratified the 1954 Convention—because I think it is up
to the military, who are engaged in what we can call classical war, not the terrorist attacks
or the bombings, to know what the military obligations are and also what constitutes
respect for the population and cultural heritage. This is my first point.
The second point is about the very interesting presentation by Benjamin Isakhan,
because I was in Mosul last week. I spent the whole day in this martyrized city. I talked
with local people. I entered the houses near the mosque, accompanied by both the
Muslims and the Christians, as well as the head of the Christian community of Mosul. And
then I spent two hours with Father Najeeb, who is now archbishop of the Mosul church. I
think that we have to be careful about the so-called negative reactions and see also the
positive ones. I know that Father Najeeb is having a very important influence in asking the
international community to help Christians to return in their city. Not only with UNESCO,
but he is in contact with the Vatican and with a number of churches. He saved thousands
of manuscripts that were deposited in monasteries and the churches in Mosul.
36 J. PAUL GETTY TRUST OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN CULTURAL HERITAGE POLICY
And finally, I want to talk about a very positive experience we had in Cambodia. I was
in Cambodia with the UN troops in 1992, when we were not able to enter the temples
because they were full of mines. We were visiting the Angkor sites with Buddhist monks
and with the local communities. The rehabilitation and restoration projects are now in
their twenty-fifth year. We have an international coordination committee working in
Cambodia, in Angkor Archaeological Park. I can say that thanks to this project, which is an
international one with public and private entities like the World Monuments Fund, for
example, the economy of the small village, Siem Reap, near Angkor now has about 150
hotels. And I saw how the well-being of the population is visible because of this project.
They have no oil, they have no gas; they have only cultural heritage in this area of
Cambodia. And the village now is becoming a town. Another difficulty we encounter is too
much tourism, so we have to find a plan for diverting people, as the Louvre does in
directing traffic around the Mona Lisa. All visitors want to go to Angkor Wat, and they
ignore, more or less, all the other temples.
ISAKHAN Thank you for these comments. They are very useful. I did want to be
deliberately provocative and to emphasize the side of the story that is not told, because
overwhelmingly, when we talk about the international community, particularly in
heritage sites, or the international community reconstructing sites out of conflict, it is
purely the positive side of the story that is told. I think that we very rarely hear the other
side of the story—that people are critical of these efforts, that people have concerns about
these efforts, that people have other, very deep-seated problems and reservations about
these efforts. I think that if these efforts are to be successful, we have to get better at
listening to those criticisms, even when we do not like them, even when they are not the
majority, even if we could statistically show that that is not the majority opinion. Because
ultimately, rebuilding heritage sites, for example, or reconstructing places without broad
consensus or without broad engagement from stakeholders only brings the opportunity
for those sites to come under threat again, and it only brings the opportunity for local
populations to come under threat again. That has happened before. It certainly happened
in Mali, where sites are being targeted and populations are being targeted again in the
wake of these things, in part because there is a resistance, a pushback, to some of this
stuff. So I think we need to be open to these different things. And we need to recognize
that there really are no data on this; we do have this kind of consensus that it is a good
thing, and only always a good thing, if we go in and do this stuff. It is very rare—I do not
think I have ever seen anything really credible—that we have actually gone in and done a
heap of interviews and a heap of surveys about how people feel about and engage with
their heritage, about how they feel about international engagement.
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4
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS
IRINA BOKOVA We have come to the issue of what exists as an international law, an
international framework. If you will allow me to enlarge it a bit, I want to speak briefly
about the conventions and about the language of these conventions. We have mentioned
many of them. And I would like first to commend you, Tom [Weiss], because in your
coauthored first Getty Occasional Paper you outlined some of these conventions and some
of the work that is being done. If you will allow me to start with a request. I think we
should stop saying that it has always been like that in history: somebody comes and
destroys heritage. Because if we say this, we eliminate all the efforts that we have made in
the twentieth century to create a rules-based mechanism or platform to ensure that this
does not happen or at least that from the point of view of international law and our
understanding, this should not be done. I have heard this argument many times, of course:
Why do you say this? You know, it happens. This is the history of humanity. It means that
we have not evolved in our understanding about heritage, about its importance, and then
about the way we treat it and the way we communicate as humanity among ourselves and
also with the heritage. So this is my first point.
The second is, I just want briefly to mention that UNESCO is the guardian of the six
major conventions in the area of culture, and it is the norm-setting organization. Of these
six conventions, three, I think, have a very direct impact on the topic that we are
discussing, but the others are also very relevant. Of course, the first one is the 1954
Convention. And it is the two protocols on the protection of cultural property in the event
of armed conflict. Mounir [Bouchenaki] will speak more on this and on how the Second
Protocol has been adopted and evolved. This is one of the Hague humanitarian law
conventions. And I would say that nowadays we have 133 countries, as of September 2018,
that have ratified this convention. I would say that because of what happened in Syria and
Iraq—Da’esh and everything—we have made an enormous effort to have more countries
38 J. PAUL GETTY TRUST OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN CULTURAL HERITAGE POLICY
ratify it. The last one of the big countries that ratified it was the United Kingdom, in
December 2017, which meant that all of the five permanent members of the Security
Council, for the first time, ratified this convention. I think this was a very important
moment. And France, in 2015, pledged; in 2016, they ratified the Second Protocol. So I
think the framework of the member states that have ratified the convention is there. This
is very important in order, on that basis, to continue working. But the situation that
evolved around the destruction of heritage made us also very cognizant that a big effort
was needed for the widest possible ratification of the cultural conventions. We have made
an enormous effort, and I think we have succeeded.
The other convention, of course, is the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.
This is the prohibition on the illicit trafficking of cultural property. Now, a few words
about it. Many countries are working to restitute stolen property or illicit trafficked
property. The problem with this convention was that there was no monitoring mechanism.
And in 2012 I convened a meeting of the state parties. You know how difficult it is to
amend international law. So the general conference of the state parties decided to
establish a committee—now there is a committee and even subcommittees—and require
also that state parties present periodic reports. And this was very important. We did that
before this big crisis in the Middle East. I come from Eastern Europe. I know the Balkans
have been looted, and I was very sensitive to these issues. But it was good that we started
this work before, because it helped us a lot later to create platforms and to work on the
basis of this convention. So this convention has been ratified by 137 countries. And this
was also a problem, because this is a convention very much linked to the illicit trafficking,
without conflict, of objects of art. Some of the big art markets were not very enthusiastic
about joining this convention. But many now have. So I think we are on a good track of
having more countries aligned around this international law.
The most important is the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage. I am not going to elaborate further because you know this
convention. I would just say that this convention has been ratified by more member states
than any other international legal document; 193 member states have ratified it. This
means that there is a lot of political commitment regarding world heritage. It is also
important because it contains monitoring mechanisms, as well as prevention mechanisms,
in terms of threatened heritage. Of course, we are not speaking only about armed conflict,
but other threats to world heritage. And here I would like to pick up once again the issue
of rebuilding, because we have to be very careful when speaking about heritage
protection. I am referring, of course, to the World Heritage List but not only that. I am
speaking broadly about rebuilding heritage. In the history of the World Heritage
Convention, there are only two instances when destroyed heritage has been rebuilt and
then included on the World Heritage List, and both of them are very emblematic for
conflict and war. The first instance is the old city of Warsaw, Stare Miasto, which was
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totally destroyed during World War II, rebuilt, and then included on the World Heritage
List—because it is a symbol of resilience, it is a symbol of, I would say, resistance to the
war, and a strong message, once again, against destruction in war. The second instance,
once again emblematic, is the Old Bridge of Mostar, which was not on the World Heritage
List when it was destroyed. It was destroyed for no strategic reasons. It was destroyed as a
symbol of eliminating and destroying the links between communities. And that is why it
was rebuilt, under the auspices of UNESCO, and named a World Heritage Site. It is one of
the unique cases precisely because of the message that it carries. And that is why I think it
is very important to be very careful when we speak about destruction of heritage and then
rebuilding it.
Now, let me turn to international law. As I said, I think we have quite a developed
framework of international law. As Tom writes in his paper, all the issues about
inconsistency in some of the terminology are right. This exists. Maybe there is also
incoherence in terms of the monitoring mechanisms for implementation. And I also agree
with this. But what I think is probably more realistic to do, because we know how difficult
it is with international law and such conventions, is to amend, to adopt. From my own
experience, I would say that there is no appetite among member states to adopt additional,
new laws. I know this because we adopted this recommendation on restoring urban
landscapes. We wanted to make a convention, and we wanted to move on other issues, but
member states were very resistant. So if we want to be realistic, I think, we have to
develop a different approach, one that is much closer to what is needed today. Of course,
the first thing is ratification. I think it is very important for us to continue our very strong
effort, so that more countries ratify these conventions. The second is implementation. We
may have a wonderful international law, but what if it is not implemented? Where do we
go? In this particular case, I think we need to link it with some of the other policies that we
want, to link it to the efforts to involve local communities in many of these cases, and to
link it to the work broadly of the United Nations, even the Responsibility to Protect. And as
I mentioned, when we were thinking of how to move forward in this very complex
environment on the basis of the Responsibility to Protect, we actually signed an agreement
with the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Call, and many, many others.
The work of the International Criminal Court, I think, is also very important. Actually, it
was our idea, UNESCO’s idea, to reach out to the ICC and say, “Well, if we say it’s a war
crime, and even the ICC also says it is a war crime, let’s try to do it.” What we did was
encourage Mali to ratify ICC, the Rome Statute. Before we did so, we told them, “Ratify it,
so that you have another means to prosecute the possible perpetrators of this destruction.”
They did ratify it. We went to the ICC, and you know the history. My deputy—your
successor, Mounir—Francesco Bandarin, went to testify to the court. We put legal teams
together, our legal team and their legal team, working together to make a case, because it
was not obvious that it would be successful. And I am very proud that we did that and that
it happened this way. As a consequence, the ICC now is working on a policy paper on the
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destruction of heritage. I spoke with Fatou Bensouda, the chief prosecutor, a couple of
months ago, for another reason. I spoke on the phone with her and asked whether they
had finalized it. Not yet, she told me, but they are working on it. And I think this will be a
next step that will also make a strong legal case for the protection of heritage and the
penal code. I think it is very important. Bensouda said probably by summer they will
finish their report and publish it, as they did with sexual violence during the war. I think it
is an important next step.
Then, of course, there is the work that we have been doing with the Security Council on
the adoption of several resolutions. Because, once again, this is the broader international
framework, setting the standard for such work. I will just mention a few cases. Resolution
2199 was important from our perspective not only because it included three paragraphs
about the importance of heritage protection and against the looting of sites, linking it with
terrorism and the financing of extremism, but it was important because it allowed us to
create a large platform of cooperation with Interpol, the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC), and the al-Qaida Committee in the Security Council in New York,
which were not the usual kind of partners we had. But on that basis, we created not just
platforms; every second month, we had video conferences that I organized with my
colleagues. For the first time, all these entities put together their synergies. They
exchanged data with the International Organization of Customs, with the UNODC, or with
us. I had not realized that there was no data sharing before that. But also, because this
helps us push strongly, we said member states should take decisive measures.
Now, when we started this work, it emerged that even in the European Union there was
no harmonized directive on an object coming from Syria, Iraq, or somewhere moving
around the European Union. You cannot trace it, because there is no established route.
There is no one single regulation that lets you harmonize the way it crosses borders and
where it is and how it goes. So this helped us also push the European Union, which even
adopted a new cultural policy. But at that time when I was still at UNESCO, more than fifty
countries changed their national registration in some way. The United States also
introduced a very important piece of legislation in Congress. They adopted this also. But
what I am speaking about in the United States is the same in the European Union. Europe
was very strict on the export mechanism but very loose on the import mechanism. So they
tightened their control also, and they harmonized their legislation. And I think this was
extremely important.
And then, of course, further resolutions were adopted by the Security Council, the last
one being 2347. I think it was an important framework of cooperation, because this
allowed peacekeepers to train peacekeepers on heritage protection. And by the way, very
many armed forces nowadays have introduced protection of heritage for their
peacekeepers. Somebody said, “Can we work without even having heritage protection
strictly in the peacekeepers’ mandate?” We can. Even just last month, in Italy, they had a
training of their armed forces, and they introduced heritage protection. So I will stop here.
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Just one word. We launched campaigns about UNESCO heritage, but it was not just a social
network. Particularly with Italy, it was to trade the synergy between the military, the
expert community, the cultural people, and academics in order to work together in similar
situations, in order to see how they can leverage their different expertise, in order either
to stop illicit trafficking or to do the peacebuilding after a heritage conflict.
LYNN MESKELL Thank you very much for having me here as a rather unorthodox
scholar. The first of the two things that I want to outline involves communities. One of the
first things I thought when I looked at this lineup of speakers was, why were there no
Syrians or Iraqis represented? Or Yemenis? I am very interested in Yemen. And I would
just say that going forward, if one—and particularly sitting in the United States—does not
want to be charged with a new form of cultural imperialism, it would have to include
those actors. As a legal scholar, a colleague, reminded me, in the 1954 Hague Convention,
in article 5 on occupation, it actually says that as far as possible any high contracting party
has to have the support of competent national authorities of that occupied country in
safeguarding and preserving its cultural property. The second point in that article is that
in occupied territory, anything damaged by a military operation should be within the
purview of competent national authorities; if they are unable to take such measures, we
should work closely with them—in cooperation with such authorities—to take the most
necessary measures for preservation. So in 1954 it was already sort of established that we
would have that community partnership. I think that on anything going forward, even
though we have heard great examples of on-the-ground working with people—and there
really are terrific case studies that are being presented—those key players really have to
be at the table also.
Of course, today heritage is not just about bilateral negotiations between governments,
as many people have pointed out. And we all know how predatory states work, even our
own. It is also about the protection of minorities. We really have to work at the local level.
And one of the most impressive examples that I have seen is the Aga Khan Trust for
Culture, in India, specifically Delhi. I also work there on heritage and humanitarianism,
looking at things like water, sanitation, issues of caste and class, violence, and gender
violence and how that all connects to heritage sites. And I think AKTC provides an on-the-
ground model of how it can be done. So it is not a theoretical model, but it is also a
research model but also in terms of lines of influence and creating positive change. Of all
the different organizations I have looked at, AKTC, I think, is the one to follow.
I fear that we are already on the cusp of being a little late to try to find out what
people’s primary needs are, what sort of heritage sites, and not simply reify or further
support the monuments that the international community sees as important. I remember
one of your colleagues, Nada al-Hassan, talking about how the French media all wanted to
talk about Palmyra. She represented the Arab Desk at the World Heritage Center and
wanted to talk about all of these other sites. But there was a sense that Europe was
42 J. PAUL GETTY TRUST OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN CULTURAL HERITAGE POLICY
claiming Palmyra for itself. So this is something to avoid, going forward. And I also
remember, at UNESCO committee meetings, say, parties like Turkey asking why the focus
is on sites and not people—again echoing some of the data that Ben [Isakhan] has
retrieved. So that is a very educated Turkish ambassador asking why the focus is on
classical sites all the time. This comes across as a fairly anti-Islamic sentiment. It was once
said of UNESCO that the book of the organization was the Bible. So there is a history there
that needs to also be overcome.
It is fair to say, although uncomfortable to accept, that this is a time we need research
and reflection because the older approaches, developed in the context of World Wars I and
II, do not work anymore and do not serve us. I have to bring up certain levels of hypocrisy,
I guess. The United States only recently signed the 1954 Hague Convention, and it has not
signed Protocols 1 and 2. Nor is the United States a signatory to the Rome Statute. There is
the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO. So this is another reason to include cultural heritage
legal scholars but also to broaden the international feeling, because we start from behind,
I think, in this particular setting.
As I mentioned, there has been a focus on Iraq and Syria, but much, much less on
Yemen, Libya, and the Crimea. Many people are hamstrung from saying or doing anything
because of how some predatory states operate. Yemen—and I am glad Simon mentioned
this—is one of the worst humanitarian disasters and also has suffered the destruction of
cultural property. In Saudi Arabia, backed by the United States and the United Kingdom,
there has been the use of cluster bombs, which are illegal according to the Geneva
Convention; there are no consequences. Yemen could not even take the floor, because no
one could afford to be sent to speak at various UNESCO meetings. So there is not just
implementation; it is even visibility, traction, the countries that count, the countries that
do not. I am glad also that people mentioned the Uyghurs. China is fairly untouchable in
most UN settings, because it’s the Gulf and China that pay for almost everything, I think,
going at UNESCO. The United States could write a check; that might help. And there are
real constraints.
I came across documentation from the Iraqi delegation complaining that the United
States and its allied forces had also damaged archaeological sites. But this was never
addressed. And I do not think it has been addressed yet. So there are other forms of
damage. Arab countries, of course, are questioning the intent and the long-term benefits of
things that we mentioned earlier today, like safe havens. The idea of giving anything to
Switzerland is almost laughable. They see this as a sort of proxy colonialism. And in a
sense, because we are vested, I think, archaeologists are probably the worst people to talk
about this because we are all— We love this stuff, it’s our job, we get paid to do it. Yes, we
are too committed in a sense.
This takes me to a recent British study on the exploitation of local researchers used for
British-funded research projects in Iraq and Syria. That is also money for archaeology and
training that is being used as a kind of partage for permits. And it is the outsourcing of
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research by these exploited and alienated people on the ground. As somebody said,
conflict creates opportunities.
MESKELL I want to answer the question about contractors. I think it was last year that
some architects and NGOs—I think it was in Mosul—circulated a series of emails, with
photographs showing, as the destruction was raging on, that contractors were coming in
and bulldozing partly damaged buildings and buildings that were not damaged at all to
make way for commercial enterprise. So in the middle of fighting, people were obviously
seeing economic advantages. And I’m not sure, but I think the hint was that these were
international contractors too. So it is business as usual. And I guess on a more
ethnographic or anecdotal note, some consultants I know who were working under
UNESCO auspices in Iraq, who have done very good work in the Middle East, were also
seeing, through this international network of consultants that we were talking about, a
European flavor, that business was being done as well. And relatives of people who were
also employed and had connections to very big European companies and banks were also
getting a foot in the door. So my concern would be always turning the gaze on ourselves,
too, that we as elites and professionals and people who have contacts or may be in
business or something, it is all getting mixed in together. One man’s gentrification is
another’s destruction. But it is happening. I guess the disgusting element is that it is
happening while bombs are dropping and people are dying.
JENNIFER WELSH Just two points. First, I think it is very useful to have the reminder that
this can be instrumentalized. But instrumentalization is very common, right? So if we
think about the anti-impunity norm of the ICC, it has been instrumentalized by a number
of states that have actually referred themselves to the ICC—Uganda and others. It has been
instrumentalized. So the question is not whether there will be instrumentalization. It will
be there. It is there with every norm. The question is, what does it look like in this field,
and how do you think about it? So it is important, but we need to put it in perspective.
Instrumentalization exists for every single normative project you will have. Second, this
question of bilateralism and multilateralism—I think in your project, it depends on what
you are trying to do. So if you are trying to set a norm, it has to be multilateral because
you have to build consensus. And you are also trying to dilute Great Power interests. That
is why we have multilateralism. But if you are trying to do something else, then it might be
both, bilateralism as well. But we should also recognize that we have to accept the effects
of bilateralism, if applied universally. So if China is engaged in the Belt and Road Initiative
in Africa, that is what bilateralism looks like. So we just have to be happy with the fact that
if we say we want to act bilaterally, we have to recognize what that looks like when
everyone is doing it. I think it is very much dependent on what your objective in the
project is, which piece of this you are engaged in. Multilateralism will be important. I
think the one piece of this that is more difficult today is that it is even difficult
multilaterally to set norms. So some states are looking at—there is a new word for this,
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and I can barely say it, pluri-lateralism—getting like-minded groups to try to set norms
simply because you cannot get a multilateral agreement. But it is rarely an either/or. It
depends very much on the objective that you have, right?
BOKOVA I think it depends on the expectations. All this debate about multilateralism and
bilateralism, I think, to some extent is probably very important, but they have different
purposes. I will continue to think that multilateralism is very important. Not least because
it is, indeed, where this kind of setting is. It is where small and big ones are. Otherwise it
will just be North-South. It is where everybody shares practices. Sometimes UNESCO or
other UN agencies go to places where bilateral organizations cannot go, because they are
considered to be neutral, to be about everybody. And I think this should be very much
emphasized. It is because it is technical; it is just engaged. And I think this is important.
Now, speaking about bilateralism, of course, we should not be naive. Everybody has their
own interest. It is like all the development efforts. Tell me how big the proportion of
nonearmarked projects or funds in the UN is. We know Nordic countries give more
nonearmarked projects. But always there is some kind of an interest. And this is where the
multilateral platform made the coherent approach and coordinated all this. It may be for
very concrete economic purposes, because it is a former colonial power that wants to
tarnish the image in some places, in Africa or Asia or somewhere else. So there is always
some kind of an interest. I am not saying it is very negative all the time; not at all. It is just
that we have to know that there is something behind this.
But I think the more important part is feeling inclusive. We are living in a world that is
fragmented, where there are tendencies to break apart platforms, institutions, and
otherwise. It is not ideal. And I know it is very hard. Those of you who have worked in the
UN context know how difficult it sometimes is. Sometimes diplomacy is hard work. It is
hard work to get a document everybody agrees on. It is work morning and evening and
night. But at the end of the day when it is there, you feel rewarded that everybody is
united around it. I think this is important.
Now, speaking concretely about UNESCO, of course, things have changed immensely.
Because of our financial crisis when the United States stopped paying its dues in 2011, I
read everything and looked at the history of UNESCO, including from that point of view. In
the 1980s, UNESCO’s staff was three times larger. There were 3,500 UNESCO staff and
probably the same number of experts. Now the number is 1,300. I myself cut 30 percent or
more of the staff because of the financial crisis. And everything changed. It is much more
political; there is more of a tendency to use it for very narrow purposes. And also because
today, I think after the 1990s, we see what is happening in the world: conflicts, mostly of a
historical and cultural nature. We need only look at Asia, the controversies between Korea
and China and Japan and some other countries that were swept under the carpet for
decades but now are coming up. And some others. Also, there is the changing geopolitics.
All this, of course, affects UNESCO and the other international organizations. So I think
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you should not expect UNESCO to do everything, like the UN. It cannot do everything. It is
about partnerships. It is about leveraging all the different mandates and capacities to do
things. If UNESCO and the UN can help build good partnerships, I think this will be a very
good cause. This is the only way forward. The other is just simply not possible, and it
should not be expected from them.
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5
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL COSTS
ISMAIL SERAGELDIN My presentation considers the economic assessment of the value of
cultural heritage. Generally speaking, we have two approaches. If something is considered
a must-do no matter what, then we are looking at cost-effectiveness—different techniques
for achieving the same result, the most cost-effective way. I mean, if you are fixing the
Sphinx or you are fixing Abu Simbel, it fits in this category. All other cases really tend to be
not a matter of cost-effectiveness but cost-benefits. And if you are doing cost-benefits, you
need to estimate the costs, direct and indirect, and the benefits, tangible and intangible.
And then you have to have a discount rate, because money in the future is not worth the
same as it is right now. Generally stated, you have to discount the money in the future.
And the formula for net present value is simply the discounted benefit stream minus the
discounted cost stream. And that is the net present value for a project that is worth doing
or not worth doing. We sometimes do a benefit-cost ratio, divide one by the other. Or
because we are so dependent on the discount rate, some people say, “No, we want to solve
for the discount rate,” and find out what we call the internal rate of return and compare
that to, for example, what you would get from treasury bills or some other opportunity
cost of capital.
So these are the rules generally followed. Estimating cost-benefits is fairly
straightforward. But the benefits become tricky because they include tourism revenues
but cannot be limited to tourism revenues, because if you do that, then you miss the
intrinsic value of heritage. And it leads you immediately to three wrong conclusions. The
first is that if foreigners are not interested in paying, it is not worth saving and protecting.
That is the logic of the argument. So if you want to keep something or some different types
of landscapes pristine but they are not seen, they have no value in the benefit-cost
calculation if tourism is the only benefit stream.
The second mistake is to try to maximize the tourist revenues, which denatures what
you value. So you go to the American wilderness, and then you find Sidi Bou Said with too
many tourists and the Great Wall of China, where you are looking at the back of the
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person in front of you. I mean, surely this is not what we want. Then there is Barcelona.
Pushing the logic of tourism as being the only real value for cultural heritage leads to all
these aberrations that we cannot live with. And then worst of all, if building a new facility
like a casino gets more tourist revenues than protecting, let’s say, Fes in Morocco, then you
should build the casino. That is what the logic of using this type of calculation says. Forget
about trying to maintain beautiful things like that.
Now, it is essential, therefore, to recognize the intrinsic value of cultural heritage and
not just limit it, as they do. That was how I found it at the World Bank when I fought my
battles on these issues back in the 1990s. So how do we calculate the economic value of
cultural assets? We need a conceptual framework. And here it is. There is a total economic
value, and there are use values and non–use values. And there are direct use values and
indirect use values; and among the non–use values, there are existence values and others,
bequest values, for example. And in between the two, there is a third category, which
economists are very good at, which is option values. It is to say, what do I need to invest
now in order to maintain my options for the future? So we do this. These are very
straightforward. But the ones that are a little less straightforward, these are the ones that
cause the most arguments. Direct benefit includes things like, for example, in historic
cities, built space, circulation space, tourism, economic activity. Indirect benefit includes
community image, environmental quality, social interaction, aesthetics, and, of course,
options to maintain your options for the future. And then there is existence value: identity,
uniqueness, significance of the event or the piece of heritage or artifact itself. And the
bequest value is something that we would like to give to future generations. For example,
we do not want to see the whales or the pandas go extinct, because we think future
generations should have them, not because they are of economic use to us. We donate
money for that.
On tangible and intangible cultural heritage, beyond individual buildings, there is
protecting something like the urban character. In many of the historic cities, you really are
not protecting individual buildings. You look at the layout of the historic buildings and
look at the buildings that are in the infill. Bukhara is an example. You can see immediately
that you cannot just destroy that overall character, even though every individual part of it
is not particularly worth protecting. The urban character, the whole, is more than the sum
of the parts. And here we have to think in terms of how to value that entirety through
scale, volumetric patterns, street alignment, mix of land use, different ages of buildings,
street activity. So then there is existence value. The easiest argument to make is to see how
people are actually willing to donate funds, governments as well as people, for the
protection of endangered species. Why? Not because of their commercial value, but
because of their existence value. And the economics of reuse, of reusing buildings, are
going to be important.
So how do we deal with intangible benefits? These were primarily developed for
environmental benefits, but they are very easy to adapt to cultural heritage benefits. We
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have traded and nontraded goods and services. Traded goods are easy: it is how much
goods and services. How much would you be willing to pay to listen to music, see a play,
get a massage, go to a movie, whatever? It is traded. You pay for it, so there is a clearance
mechanism. And its valuation is equal to the amount you are willing to pay.
But nontraded goods are more difficult. We are trying to measure the value, for
example, of enjoying the view of a mountain. There are two general approaches. We have
revealed preference through price-based models, for example two houses that are pretty
similar to each other, except that one has a beautiful view and the other one does not.
How much is the difference in price for the two? Or one is next to a dump and one isn’t.
How much is the difference between the two? That is called a revealed preference based
on price. Then we have stated preference. This is, of course, where most of it becomes
quite complicated. In price-based preference, we use travel cost, hedonic pricing. I will not
go into detail about how to do it, but trust me, we do it. And contingent valuation is the
important model because it has been supported at the highest levels of the courts.
Now, economists generally prefer revealed preference, as it involves real money that
people are actually paying, as opposed to simply asking someone, “How much is it worth
to you to have this beautiful view?” Of course they say, “Oh, a million dollars.” “Well,
would you be willing to pay Y?” “I haven’t got a million dollars.” So you want to get
something much more precise, and it is a different way of doing it. So let’s look at these
examples. There is the travel-cost method: simply, how far do people travel to go to this
historic site? That is a way of saying, then, I can imagine the valuation of that site because
people go all the way there. And demand varies with the cost incurred. If you start
charging for tickets, will the number of people diminish? Where do they come from?
Where do they go? All these calculations are considered. We can actually construct a
demand curve like that. In this case, we do not have a producer surplus but a consumer
surplus, which is the sum under this curve. And we can calculate that as being the
worthwhile investment that should be made to improve the condition of this cultural
heritage site, this particular site, based on a regression of the number of people who
actually visit the site. So, in several zones, if the costs are greater than this, the staff would
have to do something else.
Contingent valuation really is a survey-based technique for the valuation of nonmarket
resources, such as environmental preservation or the impact of contamination or the
preservation of cultural heritage. Existence values cannot be assessed through market
pricing, so contingent valuation surveys were suggested to assess them. The value of
cultural heritage is not physically used, such as a restaurant or a hotel or whatever; it is a
value, an intrinsic, intangible value of its own.
So we can see that these methods exist. We have succeeded, in the case of the
environment, in generating the Global Environment Facility. I was telling Irina [Bokova]
that my dream was to establish as well a global cultural facility. But we did that. So the
problem is that something else comes up when you have to make choices. And the choices
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are not always that easy to make, and they are not just mathematical. Why? Well, here is
an example, a very beautiful story, because we need social choice to give purpose to social
action nationally and internationally. So, let me describe a small parable, the story of the
flute and the children.
It comes from my friend Amartya Sen. You see three children, and they have a flute in
front of them. The first kid, the one on the left, says, “I’m very poor. I don’t have any toys.
This is the only thing I will have. The other two kids are very rich. They have tons of toys.
Why should they get it? So I should get it.” Well, the information is not contested, and you
think it is a fair statement, so you give it to him. Rewind. Same three kids, same flute. The
one in the middle says, “Wait a minute. I’m a musician. I play the flute. These two guys just
blow on it like a whistle. They love listening to me play the flute; I love playing the flute. So
give me the flute, and I will play, and they will listen and everybody will be happy.” Not
contested again; facts. It makes sense. But let’s take the third scenario. Same three kids,
same flute. The third kid says, “He is poor, she is talented, but I made the flute. I cut the
reed and then put holes in it. I made the flute, so how could you give it to anybody else?”
Now, what you have here, in more technical parlance, is a preference for equity or utility
or entitlement. What happens is that most of the time, choices, whether about cultural
heritage or about other investments, involve all of these. And they usually are in conflict,
which people do not like to think. “Well, you know, everybody wants to be fair, so it’ll be
X.” No. Fairness does not fall so cleanly. We frequently will have to consciously say that we
will value one over the others, at least for a period of time. For example, when we say we
want to have a quota for minority groups or for women in particular programs, and so on,
we will revisit it in five years or ten years. But for the time being, yes, we recognize that it
is not, in terms of equality or justice, the best; but this is needed now. So if we do this, then
I think we have other criteria we can discuss in social choice. But fundamentally,
designing appropriate actions, I think, requires agreement on the criteria of social choice
and what should be favored at a particular point in time and for a certain period.
Unfortunately, arguments tend to be very unstructured, not at all like Helen [Frowe]’s
presentation, where it is very clear argumentation.
So I conclude with the following: We need to evaluate possibilities using the best
techniques and giving new weight to intangible aspects, and we need to mobilize clear-
eyed approaches to social choice for making decisions.
KAVITA SINGH We are going to move from the telescope to the microscope; the very
broad view is not something I can offer. I am going to be talking about very small-scale
observations. I tried to engage with the theme of our workshop, but as an academic art
historian who spends all her time in an armchair, my position was a little different; my
experience was a little different. It has been a fantastic experience for me to be in the
same room as people from these amazingly diverse disciplines. But I felt all I can do is
think about what it would mean to get people to engage with active conflict situations and
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try to save heritage over there but to try and look at remedial action that has been taken
after conflict. And I could only come up with three observations that I thought I would
share with you, which are grounded in three very quick case studies.
Not far from where I live in Delhi, there is the historic neighborhood of Nizamuddin,
which Luis [Monreal] knows so well. This neighborhood used to be next to a river, before
the river changed its course. And this must have made it a very good place to catch cooling
breezes. And therefore, you have a structure like this, with airy pavilions, which seems to
be designed just to catch the evening breeze. This structure was built in AD 1240. And I
have made it the oldest Islamic palace building—not a mosque, but a palace—that
survived into the twentieth century. But it did not survive into the twenty-first. In 2008, it
was razed to the ground. And apparently, because it was on private property, the state was
powerless to prevent the destruction of this building when the owner decided that he
would rather build an apartment block in its place. So something irreplaceable was lost in
Nizamuddin ten years ago. But this loss was something that was felt by just a few people.
The destruction of the Isla Mahal disturbed some conservationists in Delhi. It occasioned a
few articles in the city pages of some Delhi newspapers. But the owner took the building
down. The government wrung its hands, and the journalists moved on to other stories.
This loss was rather different from the other acts of monumental losses that we have
been focusing on in the past few days, like the Bamiyan Buddhas, the structures at
Palmyra, the shrines of Timbuktu, which all caused an international outcry. So I began to
wonder, why do some things capture our attention and others not? The fact is that we are
losing a tremendous amount of heritage material every day. And dare I say that it is not
what is lost. It is not really the intrinsic value of the monument or the site that actually
raises our temperatures around the loss, but rather it is why it is lost, in what way it is lost.
Because the losses that are caused by the banalities of economic development can be
tremendous, but they do not cause the same sort of indignation in all of us. We do not feel
wounded in the same way. So this makes me feel that what is crucial is not what we lose
but how we lose it. And from Bamiyan to Timbuktu to Mosul and Palmyra, I feel that we
have all been executing moves that are kind of a slow dance. And like every dance, it grips
both partners in a series of predictable moves. Those who set out to destroy these
monuments are enacting for us our specters of Islamophobia. And then we become a
collectivity that forms in and through our opposition to them, and we make the reciprocal
move. We unite to denounce these senseless acts of deliberate and gratuitous damage. We
assert the value of the objects and the sites that are destroyed. We reiterate the deep and
profound significance to all of humanity. And isn’t it kind of ironic that so many of us feel
the loss of these obscure sites and become keenly aware of them only in the moment of,
only because of, their destruction? And it is only by experiencing the spectacle of loss that
we actually become united in claiming them as part of our heritage.
I want to ask now, what happens in the aftermath, when it is time to turn our attention
to these places after peace returns to them? Because the site is no longer the site that it
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was before. And this is not just because something was destroyed over there but also
because it has been transformed, retrospectively and prospectively, by the broadening
circle of those who have become concerned about it and have come to have a stake in it.
And when the world community becomes seized about the value of a damaged heritage
site, then it is the world that turns attention to it, offers its expertise and its funds and its
advice. And it will do this through international organizations, which will bring their
professional standards, their established methods or best practice. When this happens,
then the site turns into another kind of site. It becomes placed within a different
paradigm, and different kinds of protocols start to apply for it.
How does the arrival of a world heritage paradigm start affecting the local culture that
had subsisted, that had attached local meanings to the monuments that were part of their
environment? There is no better place to understand this than Bamiyan, I think, whose
culture, landscape, and archaeological remains were given the status of a World Heritage
Site and a World Heritage Site in danger, both in 2003, after the destruction. Most analyses
that have been written about what motivated the Taliban to target these sculptures in
2001 speak of it as a deliberate provocation that was aimed at the international
community. There are fewer sources that actually discuss the meaning that the destruction
of these sculptures would have had for the inhabitants of the Bamiyan Valley. The
Bamiyan Valley is home to a community of Hazaras, who are a Shi’a minority. They are
religiously, ethnically, and linguistically distinct from the Afghan majority, which is Sunni
and Pashtun. It is this minority of Hazaras who have suffered a very long history of
persecution in Afghanistan. And predictably, under the Taliban, this persecution was
particularly fierce. The destruction of the Buddhas took place in March 2001. It actually
followed on the heels of several massacres, in particular one that wiped out a couple of
entire Hazara villages in January 2001.
In Hazara folklore, the figures that were destroyed were not two sixth-century
Buddhas. Centuries ago, actually, the Hazaras had already incorporated these Buddha
figures into a local epic, which was about two doomed lovers. There was Salzal, a hero,
who had been commanded to slay a dragon to win the hand of Princess Shamama. And
although Salzal managed to kill the dragon, in the combat he got pierced by one of the
spines of the dragon, the poison entered his body, and he died on the eve of the wedding.
When the bride saw his body, she also died. Both the dead lovers turned to stone, so the
two sculptures are their petrified bodies. The larger one is the hero Salzal, and the smaller
one is the princess Shamama. The story of Salzal and Shamama, the Bamiyan colossi as
the physical remains, is central to Hazara identity. You can see this in the number of times
that the Hazaras in Bamiyan and in the Hazara diaspora actually evoke the names of
Salzal and Shamama in the organizations that they have set up. There are various
Facebook groups and other such organizations. There are lots of art projects as well that I
could talk about.
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Now, in the years since, some kind of peace has returned to the Bamiyan Valley. And
since 2005 Bamiyan’s governor has actually been a woman, which is another indication of
how different Bamiyan is from the other provinces of Afghanistan. As a visible symbol of
the new era that they should be in now, the Hazaras of the valley have longed to see the
statues of Salzal and Shamama rebuilt. They want to see it as a kind of undoing of the
erasure, of the Taliban’s erasure, of their heritage. They want to affirm their right to
repopulate the landscape with symbols of their culture. But Bamiyan is a World Heritage
Site now, and work on the site has to be governed by certain standards and protocols. And
although the shattered fragments have been gathered, and they have been kept in shelter,
experts are of the view that a new construction would not be possible. It would be a kind
of “Disneyfication” of the site. Clumsy rebuilding would actually lead to a withdrawal of
the World Heritage status. And so here the desires of the local community have actually
run up against a wall of professional standards. So when you had a sympathetic German
restorer tasked with consolidating the base of one of these sculptures, starting to build
these two cylinders that began to look suspiciously like legs, the central Afghanistan
government immediately sent a team to halt the work and take it down. Although the
government from Kabul said that it is only trying to protect Bamiyan’s World Heritage
status, which will be helpful for the local economy in the long run, the Hazaras of
Bamiyan are not convinced. They point out that the Mostar Bridge in Bosnia that was
completely destroyed was rebuilt; it was given World Heritage status. And so in the view
from Bamiyan, it seems as though there is not quite a level playing field in the world. The
authorities in Paris and in Kabul are using the “World Heritage” label to take something
away from the Hazaras, not to give it back to them. So the question that the Hazaras may
well be asking is this: If it belongs to the world, does it still belong to me?
I think we need to look into the complications that happen on the ground, what
happens when a wider circle of different kinds of people come to have a stake in the same
site of the monument and bring their different regimes of value to the place, their
different sense of what ought to be done and how. That is the third and final issue that I
want to raise today. It is a kind of caution about how to think about the meaning of peace
in a postconflict society. And it is a question I could have raised from the grounds of
Bamiyan. But let me ask it even more directly, through the example of a place that has
been very much on our minds over the past few weeks. Since Easter Sunday, many of us
have been thinking about Sri Lanka. And we have been thinking about it with grief about
what happened and with a sense of foreboding about what is yet to come. Along with the
churches, we know that the bombs went off in a number of luxury hotels. The Shangri-La
Hotel was a relatively recent addition to the tourism landscape of the capital of Sri Lanka,
Colombo. It was inaugurated only in 2017. But when the ground was being dug and
cleared to build this hotel, human bones were discovered. Is this something that could be
related to the fact that this was the very site that had been the army headquarters during
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the bitter civil war that had convulsed Sri Lanka for thirty years? There is a history that is
buried here.
The history is being buried even more energetically in the far north of Sri Lanka,
where the Hindu Tamil majority regions were the ones that had bitterly and very bloodily
tried to separate from the Buddhist Sinhala south. The civil war between Tamils in the
north and Sinhalas in the south ended with a most emphatic victory for the Sinhala side,
and the peace is very aggressively celebrated with triumphalist statues, which even
celebrate the army’s role in bringing peace, being built near sites where forty thousand
Tamil civilians were killed by army forces in the last push of the campaign. In the north
now, trenches and bunkers and remains of villages and the burned hulks of cars are part
of a war tourism circuit, whose audience becomes obvious when you see that all the labels
are just in Sinhala and English, not in Tamil. And so southerners are now coming up to
travel a circuit of Tamil humiliations. Meanwhile, Buddhist sculptures are being built
upon the temples where the Tamils used to worship.
So, then I have to ask, what does peace look like when a conflict ends with a winner on
one side and a loser on the other? Those on the losing side are always reminded that they
are lucky to have survived so far. If they want to carry on, it has to be on someone else’s
terms. And in situations like these, the national government will be in the hands of the
winning side. When an international community, with the best intentions, offers help for
reconstruction, will it be able to see the granularity on the ground? And will it be able to
do anything about this granularity, given that they need the permissions and the
cooperation of the national government? So we have to be alert to questions of who in this
era of peace and reconstruction is allowed to be visible, whose presence is kept hidden
and suppressed, what is remembered, what is forgotten, what is allowed to occupy space,
what has to be buried, what has to be swept away, whose heritage is reconstructed or
constructed in the name of reconstruction, for whom, and on what terms. And being
aware of all this, I think we have to ask, what can we do about the fact that in a
postconflict period what looks like peace to one group looks very much like subjugation to
another?
DEREK MATRAVERS I am a philosopher. We might disagree with the economists about
whether we are measuring value with economic measures or whether we are probably
reconstructing value. And basically, the kind of thing that Ismail [Serageldin] has talked
about is the kind of thing that philosophers discuss, the kind of thing that we think we are
very good at. So we have a lot to contribute for each of those projects.
Just some preliminaries. I have been talking to various people, soldiers included, over
the past eighteen months. And it is possible, I think, that there are at least two sorts of
cases. This has come up repeatedly in the past day or two. The first is cultural property
protections as a force multiplier, which is a phrase in my mind. And this is one of the
UNESCO handbooks on cultural property protection, called Cultural Property Protection as
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a Force Multiplier. When you talk to soldiers, this is often just what they mean. To the
extent that not damaging X is an efficient way for you to achieve minimal loss of life, you
should not damage X. That is just a standard bit of military thinking. And then X could be
the water supply, the railway system, and so on; it could also be cultural property. So
inasmuch as damaging cultural property is going to damage your mission or is going to
lead to loss of life in the long run, you should not damage cultural property. But the same
can be said for pretty much anything else. There is nothing specific about cultural
property. One of the most interesting things, for me at least, that has come up in the past
day or two is how enormously complicated that calculation is going to have to be, with
indirect effects, and so on. But it is basically an empirical matter.
This is just to talk about the instrumental value of not destroying cultural property. The
second set of cases are those that draw on the value of cultural property, in particular. So
it is not just something that for instrumental reasons you should not damage. The 1954
Convention asks warring parties to avoid damaging items of cultural property; this has
been made into an objective, and there is no feasible alternative available to obtain
military advantage to that offered by a direct act of hostility against that object. So the
upshot is that, faced with a certain situation on the battlefield, a commander needs to
decide between alternatives. The first will lead to the destruction of some cultural
property, and the second will not. Now, unless he or she is very fortunate, adopting the
second alternative will not be cost-free. Why would it be? And such a cost will sometimes
or often be borne by costs to human welfare. So there is increased risk to combatants or
increased risk to civilians. In this kind of case, when we are talking about stuff that is not
simply a force multiplier, it does seem inevitable that there are going to be choices that
you need to make between damaging cultural property or imposing costs on human
welfare.
Then in the many meetings we have had over the past eighteen months, and talking to
many heritage professionals, this claim often comes up. Cultural heritage is important to
people in a particular culture. This is clearly right, and this is the truth in the
inseparability thesis, or it is part of the truth in the inseparability thesis, so I am just going
to call this the general claim. The problem is that the general claim provides no guidance
about what to do in particular cases. We can say the general claim is true, but it is actually
not useful. Why doesn’t it provide any guidance in particular cases? Well, it is simply a
matter of a kind of logic, if you like. So take the dieter. It is true that in general eating is
good for human welfare. There is a connection between eating and general human
welfare. That gives you no guidance at all about what and whether you should eat in a
particular case. A better example is the philanderer. There is a general value connection
between sex and human welfare, we can certainly say. If that gave you a justification for
sex in a particular case, then being a philanderer would be a lot easier than in fact it is, a
lot more justifiable. There is no route from the truth of the general case to the truth of a
CULTURAL HERITAGE UNDER SIEGE 55
particular case. But the problem is, the general case does not give you any guidance about
what to do.
So what we need is a claim like this. In particular cases, the value of an item of heritage
should have weight sufficient to stack up against other goods. This is the kind of thing that
Ismail was talking about. We need some account of the intrinsic value, in such a way that
in the particular case we can say, “Okay, here’s the cost, and the benefit is preserving the
cultural property. And that’s a good thing, because the cultural property has this value.”
However, as I said, you cannot get from the general claim to the particular claim. But I
think there is another danger, which is that if we cannot substantiate the particular claim,
we are in danger of undermining the general claim. Because if in each particular case you
cannot justify preserving the cultural value, then the general claim dies a death by a
thousand cuts. Because if in each particular case the cultural property goes down, then in
the end the general link between value and cultural property is going to be eroded. So this
is very brief. I’m going to just sketch three possible solutions to this, three possible ways
out.
The first is to talk to people like Ismail and what he means by intrinsic value of the
cultural property. It is an age-old debate between philosophers and economists as to
whether there is such a value, which is not simply exchange value. So can we establish a
notion of heritage value, the value of the stuff, sufficient to stack up against moral values?
Because if cultural property does have a value, then maybe that stacks up against damage
to human welfare and we are quite right to prioritize it. There are such accounts. Carolyn
Korsmeyer has published a book called Things: In Touch with the Past [2018], which I think
is the most sophisticated defense of the value of cultural property in philosophy so far. She
does not attribute to cultural property the kind of value that is going to stack up against
things like risk to human life. Then there is my favorite philosopher, Richard Wollheim,
who is quite happy to let people just go down the tubes in order to prevent any damage to
works of art. So he has the strong view, which would help us out here; but his view is
unacceptable for other reasons. So there are such accounts. I do not think this approach
should be ruled out. Maybe we can come up with a notion of intrinsic value that will stack
up against moral value, the welfare for human beings. But it has not been done yet. So I do
not think we should rule out that if one wanted to go down this road there is work that
would really need to be done.
A second possible solution is aggregation. This is a nice technical bit of philosophy. Let
me give you an example. Say you have fifty villagers, each with fifty beans, and fifty
hungry soldiers are coming to the village. Now, you might think that if one of the soldiers
takes one of the beans from the villager, they are not doing that villager any harm,
because they are leaving that villager with forty-nine beans. So no harm is done by taking
just one bean. So then you get each of the fifty soldiers to take just one bean from each of
the fifty villagers. The soldiers end up with fifty beans each, and the villagers end up with
no beans; but no harm has been done because no soldier has taken more than one bean
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from every villager. Now, that is clearly an unacceptable result. So what we do is, we say
that you have to aggregate harms. Taking one bean from one villager is not no harm at all;
it is a small harm. And then you aggregate the small harms, and they add up to a big harm.
So on that kind of principle, what you would do is say the value of an item of cultural
heritage contributes to future millennia, so that maybe people are going to look at it,
people are learning from it, all these little values are going to happen for the next few
hundred years. You stack all those up, you aggregate them, and maybe you end up with
something big enough to outweigh the disvalue to human value in preserving it, in a
particular instance on the battlefield. But this relies on us having some kind of notion of
the value of cultural property. And unless we are working with a substantial notion of the
value of heritage, then simply piling up the numbers does not help. Unless you have a
fairly substantial notion of what the value of cultural heritage is, then just adding it
together is probably not going to stack up against damage to human welfare. Again, I do
think aggregation is going to have to get into the picture somewhere. But without some
notion of the value of cultural property, then this isn’t it. This does not yet help.
The third solution says, “Let’s fix some conception of a flourishing, worthwhile life.”
Call that K. I just picked a letter out of the alphabet. So there is some conception of a
worthwhile life. K will include access to basics. This is a flourishing, worthwhile life for
some reasonably affluent Western person, let’s say. Include access to basics but also to
health services—hospitals, education; schools, universities, and culture, books and
museums. So K is what it is to have a worthwhile life. Then the claim is that individuals
can reasonably be expected to make sacrifices. If they are not making sacrifices, it would
degrade K. So you cannot call on people to not make sacrifices if they are not doing so to K.
So the very sick have no call on our resources if expending those resources on them would
degrade, say, general access to education. So we do not have to give up our humanities
departments and funnel the money into medical research, which, if you are a
consequentialist, you might think you have to do. Why not? Well, existence of humanities
departments is part of what it is to live a flourishing, worthwhile life. So you cannot take
away what is part of a flourishing, worthwhile life in order to meet even urgent needs. So
if you can find something in K that will give us the particular claim—that is, that in each
and every instance, there is something to be said for preserving cultural property; it stacks
up against welfare—then we’re home and dry.
Okay, we might say that it is part of a flourishing, worthwhile life that people have
access to cultural heritage. That is not going to be strong enough, because all you need is
some cultural heritage around. That just gives you the general claim; it does not give you
the particular claim. That just says people need to have access to cultural heritage, but that
is not going to help the commander on the ground to decide whether or not to destroy the
Roman fort or risk his helicopter crews. So try this one. It is part of K to live in a
community that values each and every person having access to cultural heritage. Maybe
that is plausibly part of what it is to live a flourishing, worthwhile life. But again, that is
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not strong enough to give us the particular claim; that probably just gives us the general
claim. Or again, we need some cultural heritage and to make sure that people, each and
every person, have some kind of access to it. Again, that is not strong enough, so let’s try
another one. We could say, “Well, part of living a flourishing, worthwhile life is living in a
community that values heritage to the extent that it will value each and every instance of
heritage.” And this will certainly give us the particular claim. So now the commander on
the hill says, “Okay, I am part of the community that values heritage to the extent that it
values each and every instance of cultural heritage. This is an instance of cultural
heritage; hence, my destroying it will degrade what it is to live a flourishing and
worthwhile life.” The trouble is, that gives us a particular claim, but it is difficult to show
why that should be part of what it is to live a flourishing and worthwhile life. So we are
stuck in a kind of dilemma. It just seems plausible that some kind of relation to cultural
heritage is going to be part of what it is to live a flourishing and worthwhile life. The
trouble is, the more plausible we make that claim, the less it gives us the particular claim.
It only gives us the general claim. I think, basically, this is another route to roughly the
same conclusion that Helen [Frowe] came to yesterday, which is that it is difficult to see
how we can make concrete and enlightened progress in this area without having a more
substantial account of what the intrinsic value—the value of cultural property—is that
stacks up against other values.
TIMOTHY POTTS I want to suggest the example of Isaiah Berlin and his thoughts about
reconciling incompatible goods, which he said you cannot always do. It does seem to me
that that is important, because I think we all, in our bones, know that there is no perfect
magical solution that will maximally protect every human being and maximally protect
every worthwhile cultural site or property or whatever. So it does come around to some
sort of compromise between the two. And it just struck me in your third solution, and that
is, of course, what we have been struggling with. What is that? How does that compromise,
and how do those individual judgments, how are they taken in individual cases, as you are
setting it up here? But it does seem to me in this third solution, the one dimension that you
have not brought into play is the level of importance of the cultural heritage targets, as it
were, here. You talk about whether it is just access to one or access to many. But, in
practice, it comes down to decisions about which are the most important sites to be
protected. And of course, there are World Heritage monument listings and other measures
of the importance of individual sites. Surely that comes into play in the judgment, if you
want this field commander or whoever you are imagining is making these decisions, if
there are those reference lists of which are deeply important sites. In the Iraq War, there
were consultations with archaeologists about what were the most important sites in Iraq.
So that information was there. It was not always followed. It seems not to have been taken
into account to the extent that it should have been. But surely that is the way to get some
sort of third solution compromise between people and sites that gets the sites back into the
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picture in a way that can be quantified and where that evaluation of their importance
comes into play.
MATRAVERS I’m concerned that that is kind of an externally driven decision about what
“K” is. So the World Heritage List, for example, is essentially technocrats and experts
making a decision that Palmyra is more important than this local mosque. And if you feed
that into the operational realities of a military on the ground, it is going to undermine
what K means to the local people. So my thing on all of this is, if you are going to go
around looking at K, the question about K is to ask people, “What does K say to you?” And
that answers this question of which heritage site is most important to the value that you
place on it as a local community, rather than we are going to make these sorts of aggregate
decisions that cultural heritage is part of K. And we are also then going to make a decision
about which cultural heritage site is part of K. So again, clearly, in the UNESCO World
Heritage List there would be particular sites. But do those have any local currency to a
civilian population that is much more concerned about protecting a Shi’a mosque, for
example, that may have no aesthetic, no historical, no monetary value? No, you could not
calculate it by any economic index because it is just built out of cinderblocks. But in terms
of the religious and political currency for that local population, it is very high on their K
ranking. I mean, they may not even know that they live next to an archaeological site.
They may not be at all interested. So there is a whole heap of problems about this idea that
we can make decisions about what K is for other people.
SERAGELDIN I have one observation and a question. When you [Matravers] spoke earlier
on aggregation, and you said the loss of one heritage site after the other would undermine
in a thousand cuts and so on, why is that so? Again, let’s just go back to the environment
for a few moments. The loss of an individual whale does not diminish but in fact increases
the desire to protect the remaining whales. So in no way does that reduce the value of
cultural heritage. It just makes it more important. And second, on the question of
valuation, which as Tim [Potts] just said—I happen to agree with you fully that what we
have now is better than nothing. Wherever people can criticize it, it is better than nothing.
But there is something else, which is the issue of unique exemplars. So I remember, for
example, a very tiny godforsaken hammam in Old Cairo, which my mother used to show
me. It was the only Ayyubid hammam. And it was destroyed by the local population. Not in
any act of vandalism. It was kind of a rundown little place, so somebody would take a
lintel, somebody would take a piece of wood, and somebody would take something else.
The people are building their shacks out of bits and pieces, and pretty soon the hammam
disappeared. It was not a monument, especially when you compare it to the monuments
in Cairo—the Mamluk monuments, the Fatimid monuments, and so on. It was not that. But
it was unique. It was the only exemplar that we had from this period. And that adds a
special quality that we also need to think about: Do we want to have a continuity, like
putting beads on a string, a continuity of various periods of our past existence represented
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in various exemplars small and big, even though individually it may not say much? Even if
the local community does not care. I mean, today, let’s say their children have gone to
university and these guys have come from the villages, and they are just agglomerated in
Cairo. In the university, they will learn about Salahudin Ayyubi and the Ayyubid dynasty
and so on. And don’t I wish that we had one thing to show you? So I think that, therefore,
the criteria that we are using have to be also, as I think Kavita [Singh] mentioned, partially
local. But “local” in a broader sense that would say not just what the local guys today want
but that in essence, potentially, their children will. For sure, their children will change
attitudes. So I find that part of how to bring in the locals or the local view with a
perspective of the specialists and the historians particularly complex in how to put these
things together.
MATRAVERS Just on the first point on the whales, I was not factoring in human
psychology. The thought was just this: If we say, look, we value whales being around, but
we do not have an account of the value of the whales such that whenever an individual
whale comes up to be killed or not, we cannot say it should not be killed, then every time it
is up for a whale to be killed and it gets killed, sooner or later there won’t be any whales.
And we can have our general claim that we value whales but without whales.
LUIS MONREAL The general claim then translates into don’t kill any whales. That is the
tricky bit. But that is why in practice there are certain types of regulations. I mean, we
have gone through this again with the environment, on fishing and sustainable fishing
and whatnot. There are regulations that put some boundaries on what you can do. But
there are others that say this is completely forbidden.
MATRAVERS As an economist or a lawyer, you can rely on existing law to say, “Look, the
justification for not doing this is that the law says you shouldn’t.” But you have to ask the
further question as to what is the justification. It is not just that it is a sentence written in a
certain book.
HELEN FROWE Tim, on your thought about the ranking, the problem is that— I mean, I
agree with you. You could factor that into how you rank internally within the group. The
problem with commensurability is that you have to rank across types. And knowing that
we can choose, from best to worst, does not tell us anything about how the shoes compare
to the hats. And what we are after is an account of value that we can factor into
comparisons. So an internal ranking within the group is not very useful without what
Derek’s pointing to. It is a sort of value that stacks up against other values. So just knowing
the internal ordering of a group does not give you an ability to compare across groups.
So if what we are after is something like, what should you do in these cases where you
have to say that if you damage the site, then you face other costs? Just pointing to the fact
that we have a list that ranks the sites does not help.
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The answer to the question as to whether we should try harder if a site has a very high
ranking is “not necessarily,” because it might be that none of the shoes are worth one of
these. Even the least good hat is worth more than all of the shoes, right? That could be
true. So, no, it does not follow that you try harder. It is that you have to have some way of
comparing the goods where there is some unit of common currency, which is whether you
can translate them into something that can be traded, which we talked about yesterday.
What are the currencies that could be on the table? But the mere fact that within the
group this is number 1 does not show that you sacrifice more of some other good for
number 1 of that group.
MATRAVERS No, but surely in the humanitarian case, if there is one life at risk there and
a thousand lives at risk there, that is a basis for protecting a thousand lives with one. So in
the same way, if there is a monument of extreme importance quality-wise versus one of
minor importance, you try harder to preserve the one of more importance. So in the real
world, I think, even though the perfect calculus says how many lives are worth this listed
building, there is never going to be a calculus that delivers a clear answer. But in terms of
relativities, then the more important monuments are taken into consideration more, in the
same way that more lives are taken into consideration.
FROWE Lives are commensurable, but heritage is not. What we are trying to articulate is
the feeling, right? What does that consist in that justifies that kind of way? Why is it
appropriate in the heritage? I agree with you that it is. But we need to know why it is. So
what we are contesting is not that people care about this stuff. It is just saying, “Well, it’s
woolly and it’s difficult, you can’t.” The complaint is not that we do not have a precise
number; the complaint is that it is really hard to go about making any kind of comparisons
at all. And ranking internally in groups does not help.
SINGH I think this argument actually links back to what I was trying to say from the
Bamiyan example, because if we went around asking people what actually constitutes K
for them, who we ask changes the answer. So if you ask what you consider a local
community with other people who are living right around a monument, or you ask a very
far-flung set of people who will make pilgrimages to that place but do not live physically
contiguous to it, or you ask archaeologists, as you start asking different sets of people, you
will have different kinds of answers and different reasons for valuing certain things, and
it keeps skewing the answer and the valuation that you make. So here I just want to point
to the danger—I’m calling it danger; you may not call it danger. But just the change or the
shift that happens as something starts meaning something to a very large group of people,
what it means can be in complete opposition to what it meant, you know? And therefore
skewing can happen. We have to be aware of that.
SCOTT SAGAN I want to point out that when philosophers use the term “true,” they mean
it in a very distinct way, which is that I can think of some logical problem that makes it so
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that it is not true in all cases, and therefore it is not true. I would side with Tim that in the
real world we ask soldiers all the time to make proportionality judgments about how to
trade off human lives, collateral damage, against the value of a military target. It would be
disproportionate if in order to kill one enemy soldier, which is a legitimate military target,
you have lots and lots of collateral damage. But we definitely restrain ourselves from
having a strict definition, because we want that commander to use his or her judgment
about how important this target is in this particular case. And we cannot figure out an
abstract law that will be useful, because it would end up being quite artificial. I think it is
the same here. We have to have some judgment about how important that cultural
heritage is, and why. It could be important for many different reasons. And then we have
to make judgments about two different things. One is the value of collateral damage: What
other harm is being done? But the other is the value of the soldiers. And I would object to
calling them all the same value because those are very different values. We want our
soldiers to take some risks, whether to protect our cultural heritage or somebody else’s
cultural heritage. So I think we have laws that are built in order to preserve some human
judgment about these issues but take into account the difficult-to-measure value of
cultural heritage but also of military advantage.
SERAGELDIN I agree with Scott on this point. But I think the key point that I find is that
people do not want to put a number on life, simply stated. We know how to do it, we can
do it, there are many techniques, and so on. But the fact is, you make an implicit judgment.
I will give an example. How many redundant systems do you put in? At some point, you
say, “Enough.” When you say, “Enough,” I can tell you, given probabilities and so on, what
that means in terms of what value you have put on a human life in a future accident, as
opposed to putting in a third or a fourth redundant system, for example. There are a lot of
calculations that were involved in the early parts of the space program when the
redundant systems were being put into the International Space Station and things of that
nature. So we also do not want to say that I will value my soldier’s life as twenty-five
collateral damage lives. Nobody wants to say that. It can be done, but nobody wants to do
that. So that is a taboo area where nobody goes. And therefore you are never going to get
into a situation that says, “My God, this is so great, we should be willing to sacrifice 125
lives for it.” That is never going to happen. And therefore we are going to have to live with
this. I think in many ways that is the best of all possible worlds. Because you will never get
agreement even among those who legislate, much less among those who will actually
implement, on points like that. “My soldier’s life is worth twenty or twelve or five
collateral damage lives or whatever.” So you are going to end up with situations where we
just have to accept a blurred boundary rather than a clean boundary, in the sense of being
able to say quantitatively what needs to be done. And I think that that is just part of the
reality of the problem we are dealing with and the manifestation that cultural heritage is
not an absolute measure, because we among ourselves could even disagree on the
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individual ranking of particular monuments. But as I said, I agree with you that what we
have is better than anything else, so let’s start with it. But if you sat down, you could say,
“No, I think this one should be number 34 and this one should be number 42 rather than
the other way around.” So if you have that mushiness, we should not try to take it too far
toward the very precise calculation, because we will not get there. And then we will have
to accept that it is very difficult to justify losing human lives for the protection of cultural
heritage.
MATRAVERS I think that’s right. I do not think the argument is about exactitude. I think
the argument is this: You are quite right, soldiers are used to making decisions about
collateral damage and loss of human life among troops and so on. There is never going to
be exactness. But now we just shove something else in, and we say, “Oh, and by the way,
another calculation you have to make is that there is a lot of cultural property out there,
and you have to make a judgment about destroying the cultural property or losing
soldiers’ lives. But we are not going to tell you anything about the value of the cultural
property. We are not even going to justify that cultural property has a value. We are just
going to leave you to hang out to dry.” And that is the tricky bit—not to do with exact
values or anything, just to do with we do not say anything.
SAGAN Well, that is what I wanted to say. I feel we have a responsibility. It does not
matter whether it is in peace or in war. It is about decision-making, which is what you are
saying. And unless we can give the people who are making the decisions, whoever they
are, the information and the evidence—and this is what I was saying yesterday—I think
we have a responsibility, as cultural heritage specialists, to actually say, “This is what we
think in terms of the priorities.” There may be other priorities if we have the time to
discuss it with the local community. But given that we are at war, we probably won’t. And
in peacetime, we probably would have the time, but we never actually make the time. And
we should.
MATRAVERS A commander has to have as much evidence as possible, so that he or she
can say, “If I let go the artillery, what’s going to happen? Do I save many more lives but
lose something that actually most people say is not very important?” But the local
community might say, “Whatever you do, don’t touch that building.” And that is where you
get a dilemma. I feel that we do have that responsibility to give as much information as
possible, in whatever wording we might use, in a prioritized way. It is not so much
ranking, because we are not ranking oranges and pears or whatever; we are saying that in
terms of our expertise as cultural heritage specialists, we think this has cultural value that
will be of benefit in the future. And it does not matter whether it is Stonehenge or just one
bit of stone; it is important. But we need to have that so that the commander has that
communicated on a map or somewhere.
CULTURAL HERITAGE UNDER SIEGE 63
I mean, the opposite happens. I have not mentioned this, but there is evidence that in
the war in Yemen many of the cultural heritage targets were not hit, and then a no-strike
list was sent. And I think they didn’t see the “no” bit, and it became a strike list. Of the ten
sites that were given, within a day five had been hit. And suddenly a message was then
sent, saying, “That was a no-strike list.” Because if you are a bored Saudi pilot flying an
F-16 and you don’t know what to do, and you have a list in front of you, you might say,
“Oh, we’ll go here.” So they press the coordinates and go. And they were bombing stuff
that was in the middle of nowhere, and there were no Houthis around. So you have to be
careful with the evidence you give.
MARY MILLER I want to return to one of the questions that Kavita [Singh] asked us and
think about this question of the banality of most cultural heritage destruction. It is this
question of how things are lost, not how they are destroyed. But actually, Kavita, you said,
“If it belongs to the world, does it still belong to me? But does it only belong to the world
when it is destroyed?” So to ask the question that way, and to ask particularly of Derek
[Matravers] as well, that all of these are addressed to what has been determined to be part
of cultural heritage only under the conditions of war. The banality of the rest of
destruction, is there some way to address that in your framework? And have I created a
kind of corollary that it only belongs to the world under the conditions of destruction, and
otherwise no one seems to pay attention?
SINGH That is not true, but it is one of the ironies of what has unfolded in recent years.
We have become aware of things that were not part of the canon of things that people
were concerned about. We have become extremely concerned by them because of the
very dramatic and highly televised and reproduced images of destruction. And that caused
some sense of urgency about cultural heritage, which is why even a meeting like this takes
place. Without that, without those particular enactments, you would not have had a
number of international endeavors; you would not have had a number of meetings,
concerns, NGOs being formed, whatever has happened in the international arena. And it
still does actually try to stave off these kinds of deliberate and symbolic acts or the
collateral damage that we are all now seeing. It is exactly a tradeoff between human lives
and heritage, because the nature of warfare is changing, where the wealthier countries
want to spare the lives of their soldiers by not putting troops on the ground. They are
doing more aerial bombing and drone bombing, and that is leading to more grand-scale
destruction on the ground, which then has the effect of heritage destruction as a corollary.
So I think an acceleration of a certain process in which—I do not know whether it is a kind
of deliberate provocation on the part of some people or it is an “Oops, I did that” on the
part of some other people—there is an awareness of this unnecessary destruction that is
happening. And the same moral outrage does not apply to what is seen as necessary
destruction for development.
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IRINA BOKOVA This is a very interesting discussion, but I want to make just a few
remarks. We all know that it is very messy when it comes to this type of conflict. It is very
messy. It is not a structured kind of approach—you know, we first speak to the community,
then the community takes a decision, then we have priority and all this. I do not know
now of a case where there was an intervention that is totally justified only to liberate a
World Heritage Site, let’s say. Or not a World Heritage Site but a heritage site. Of course, in
some cases it was used for the justification of an intervention. I am speaking about Mali
once again. It is not what was in the mind only of the French troops and others, but it was
also part of the justification of an intervention that was having a military purpose, ousting
the extremists. But it was a very strong case to say that on top of that, we are also acting
here in order to rescue the manuscripts and the mausoleums and to rebuild. In other
cases—Palmyra, the Russians—there was the same type of rationale, more or less. But I
tend to think, as Tim [Potts] said, that in terms of this type of ranking, my experience in
UNESCO was that whenever we had such cases we always tried to give the justification or
to tell the intervening power, “Hey, watch it, because here there are World Heritage Sites
or some other sites of importance.” I am speaking about Libya. When the Libyan operation
started, we immediately sent all the maps and the lists of the World Heritage Sites in Libya
to say, “Be careful, because this is something really important. We don’t know how you’re
going to proceed, what your military operation is, what you are going to do, but you have
to be careful.” The same with Mali. Again, we prepared this famous Passport of World
Heritage, eight thousand pieces, and we wanted to put it in every single pocket of the
soldiers there—the maps, a small passport with the World Heritage Sites—so that they
would know its value. We explained, “This is important for this and this value,” in order to
educate them. And then it was included in the peacekeeping training.
So my point is that it is indeed a messy kind of situation. It is difficult unless you are
prepared. In many cases, like Yemen, we know the story because I also issued some
statements. But in the end, we tried to intervene from the UN, from New York once again,
with the Saudis and the others, in order to prevent destruction. But the argument that was
given after the bombing and destruction of the old town of Sana’a was that rebels were
there, the Houthis were there. So it was part of the military conflict, and it was difficult, of
course, for us to to make a judgment. My point is that it is very difficult, in my view, in real
life, to quantify. It is difficult to make a strict hierarchy, and it is difficult to make a very
specific sequence of actions that we have to take. We just have a few elements that we
know from practice, from real work. And I think this way of ranking the value side of it, if
we can do it before a conflict, although we do not know where it will be, is important.
The distribution of information helped, as I said, in Yemen. It helped immensely. And
the fact that now we have all kinds of peacekeepers training, even this is already a step
forward. Because they will go to different places. We do not know where exactly they will
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go, but they will be cognizant of something that is important, that is of value. So I think
that opinion is shifting. And this is already something positive, in my view.
BENJAMIN ISAKHAN I think with these interesting conversations about trading off
between human life and heritage a calculation that can be considered is whether you are
trying to win the war or whether you are trying to win the peace. So if the immediate
calculation is between human life and heritage, and all you’re imagining is the kind of
operational situation that you are in, then you have a fairly small view of the role that
heritage could play into the future. What if heritage protection could be reframed to mean
winning the peace and hearts and minds, about creating a counternarrative to ISIS? Let’s
just take that as a really crucial example. If ISIS has been so oppressive and done all these
horrible things and destroyed heritage, yet you are making calculations in the moment
only about whether heritage is more important than one of our soldiers’ lives, it does not
point to the power of the counternarrative of protecting heritage when you are trying to
defeat the ideology. Because ISIS is much more about defeating the ideology than it is
about the practical military gains you can make on the ground. So if you are thinking
about winning the peace, this calculation, this kind of way of trading human life versus
heritage, you cannot just be basing it on the strategic operational gain in the moment. That
clearly might be a whole different set of situations and decisions from the strategic long-
term gain of winning the peace, where you might actually save thousands or tens of
thousands or even hundreds of thousands of lives by making decisions in the moment that
affect the long-term consequences of the war and stop it from dragging out or
degenerating into civil war and so on. So I think we have to be really careful that the
moment represents an important point at which these military operatives have to make
clear decisions, and we are putting them under very stringent ethical guidelines and all
kinds of pressure. But we also need to be cognizant of the fact that those decisions have
much more consequence in the long term than perhaps just one life versus one heritage
site indicates here.
SERAGELDIN I have two points that I think we need to raise. I mentioned one before, and
I really want to repeat it again, because I do not think we are giving it enough attention.
But I have been encouraged by what Irina just said. I think that one area that is not going
to be as controversial is to argue for a significant and expanded disaster-risk reduction by
training people, by building additional facilities, by improving conditions in heritage sites,
by preparing little maps, maybe, to have them available to storage facilities, transport
systems. I think that we can probably use the specter of war as an added factor to
encourage people to support a program of expanded preparation and disaster-risk
reduction rather than focus on how we intervene when the war is there.
The second point, which has not been mentioned at all, is that there are significantly in
the United States, but probably elsewhere as well, a number of people who are working on
programming weapons of war. And so far the logic has been—and I had discussions with
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one or two of them—that they still insist on keeping a human person in the loop. They
have not yet crossed the Rubicon of saying we shall delegate the authority to a drone or
artificial intelligence, or whatever. And the very logic of being able to do that has now
forced them to articulate the parameters of human choice. The computers will make
calculations and tell you there is a chance of X collateral damage at such a distance. Based
on what we know, the likelihood is Y collateral damage. Now, it is, I think, interesting and
relevant to be able to talk to the people who are doing this kind of analysis and this kind of
programming and at least for us to understand better what they are doing. Also, maybe we
can suggest to them that one of the additional things they should put into their algorithms
is cultural heritage sites. I mean, not just how many villagers would be killed by this drone
or if it is fired right now within X meters, but they should also factor in cultural heritage
sites, and that may slow the decision-making. This is real stuff going on right now. I am not
inventing it.
PAUL H. WISE This is a really interesting conversation. But it seems like there is a
taxonomy of considerations being developed. I just want to point out that the decision to
put soldiers in harm’s way is a political decision. And we have not talked enough about the
politics of warfare, the politics of destroying a cultural heritage site. There are cultural
heritage sites that will cost lives in the end. The destruction of a mosque that sets off
sectarian fighting for five years costs thousands of lives. There will be other types of
attacks that we know will cost lives, and there is a high political cost in allowing those
heritage sites to be destroyed. There will be other political costs that can be identified, not
perhaps analytically, but merely by elevating case studies where over and over and over
again the political cost of allowing a heritage site to be destroyed has been substantial, so
that you begin to create political sensitivity to types of heritage sites that may not directly
cost lives or indirectly cost lives but that would have a political cost in ways that are going
to elevate their protection. There is a component of the taxonomy that is intensely local.
And there, it may be that the reliance on local sensitivities is part of the calculations made
by local commanders about local support for their occupation or their military activities.
But any good commander is going to identify what is important to the local population.
And that is the arena where it takes place. So it is a training aspect; it is a military concern.
It could be counterinsurgency, and it could be other kinds of fighting. But that is going to
fall into a local commander’s smart fighting capability; it is never going to rise to the
attention of a group that is going to be able to identify fifty thousand individual sites that
are local. But it would be too bad if we allow this conversation to end up that everything is
blurred. But rather we can create a taxonomy—I think there is one being created—in
which you have five categories of significance. And virtually all will have political
significance. And those political considerations, in the end, are going to be far more
important than any ranking or cultural value, unless that cultural ranking is somehow
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transformed into political considerations. We have the ability to do that. But it will take
some type of taxonomy or some type of strategic organization to make this clear.
JAMES CUNO How many parallels are there to this? In other words, probably there is a
parallel between the decisions made about putting medical workers in harm’s way or
journalists in harm’s way and the kind of conversations that they have as they make those
kinds of calculations and decisions.
WISE There are. And there are rules, and there are laws, and there are conventions. But
in the end, it’s political. And it will be a political consideration. Anybody who is going to
put a humanitarian potentially in harm’s way needs to understand the political situation,
the political context, because Russians bombed hospitals. The Saudis are bombing water
infrastructure and clinics. Nothing has happened to protect them. So your decision about
sending me into Yemen, for example, has to be based on a fundamental understanding of
the political war-fighting context in that setting. And that is why I am not in Yemen. But I
went to Mosul, because there was a different kind of political military security
consideration. And I am suggesting that we can create a taxonomy for decision-making
that would help political and military security decision-makers understand the utility, the
incentives, and the disincentives around cultural heritage protection. I think the elements
have been discussed, coming from different disciplines; but it may be useful to now begin
to identify those four categories of concern in which decision-makers, war fighters, and
security people, as well as those inherently focused on protecting cultural heritage, can
have some disciplined conversation about decision-making and not leave it to a
commander to figure out without any type of guidance. But that is pretty unusual. These
are political considerations about putting people in harm’s way, about what is going to be
bombed and what is not going to be bombed. And we can, I think, do better in trying to
inform those political considerations based on the experience and expertise sitting in this
room.
This has been really fascinating to me as a specialist on the security side, to hear this
conversation. I can see some analogies, and I want to make just two of them. One is that
there is debate in the just war doctrine literature and the laws of our own conflict
literature about how much you value your own compatriot combatant versus a foreign
civilian, an adversary or a neutral civilian. One Israeli philosopher argues that a soldier is
a civilian in uniform and that we should value his or her life the same way that we value a
foreign noncombatant. And others, like the eminent philosopher Margalit and the political
theorist Walter, argue, no, on the contrary, all civilians are of equal value, and you should
value an adversary civilian just the way you value your own, and a military soldier should
take the same risk to protect a civilian in another country as he or she should take to
protect civilians at home. It seems to me that we could have similar kinds of debates about
the protection of cultural heritage. Not just the question about which is more valuable, but
ours or theirs? Ours or someone else’s? I would say we should view these all the same. So
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think about some of you who have offices near St. Paul’s. There is a statue to the
firefighters, some of whom lost their lives saving cultural heritage in London. There are
probably tradeoffs. They could have worked on a house nearby as well, but they
prioritized protecting cultural heritage. And we value that. We honor them because of
that. Shouldn’t we also, then, honor the soldier who decides to protect cultural heritage
somewhere else, even at some risk to his unit or at some risk to winning the war, the
soldier who says, “I’ll fight another day rather than shoot at that sniper”? Now the
dilemma here is that the more that is known, the more incentive you give an adversary to
do these things. I think it is great that you gave the forces in a bombing campaign in Libya
a list of sites, but that should have been classified information, because all that
information would lead people to move to those sites so that they could fight more
effectively. So in warfare you have this other dilemma that we have to be addressing.
The second point I want to make is about the role of technology here. It would be useful
to think about what kinds of technologies could be more useful and could be developed
that would protect cultural heritage with less cost to military advantage. So, to give an
example in terms of collateral damage, the Wall Street Journal has just leaked information
that the U.S. military has developed a new version of the Hellfire missile, which is
commonly used on drones [May 9, 2019]. Instead of having an explosion—the question
always has been how much ordnance to use—this new version, according to the paper,
penetrates with just an inert warhead and then opens up like a trident. So there is no
explosion at all. If you can pinpoint the person you are going after, you can execute him
without blowing up anything around him. Now, that creates a lot of questions about moral
hazard and how often you use it, and so on. But it is an example of an expensive military
technology developed in order to avoid collateral damage. Has anyone thought through
what kinds of, not target maps, not prioritization lists, but what kinds of technologies you
could use, in terms of nonlethal weapons, to protect an area?
SIMON ADAMS I want to try to shift the discussion a bit, because I think we are in danger
of focusing too much on the military dimension to all of this, and life versus statue, rocks
versus troops’ lives. It seems to me that these are obviously the most extreme situations,
and they are very, very important for that reason. And I think there are efforts being
made. Irina mentioned what happened in relation to Mali and Libya and so forth. But, for
example, if you look at what I would consider one of the most dangerous programs of, to
use that term, “cultural cleansing” that is going on right now, something I mentioned
yesterday, the case of the Uyghurs, this is not a military question at all. In fact, looking at it
from a military point of view is completely unhelpful. No one is going to invade China and
come to the defense of the Uyghurs. It is really just a question of whether the international
community has the political will to confront the Chinese about this question. And to the
question of whether it is a value discussion at all, are you willing to risk your trade
relationship with China in order to raise the question of the Uyghurs and the fact that the
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Chinese government is systematically destroying mosques and other places of cultural
significance? I think in the work that my organization does, that is actually the way in
which it comes up most often: not in a military context, but in a nonmilitary situation. So
even somewhere like Myanmar, where there has been this horrible genocide that
happened from August 2017 on, with 720,000 people being forced to flee the country
between then and December 30, and now with almost a million Rohingya refugees across
the border in Bangladesh, the real question that keeps coming up is that the government
of Myanmar, which is going out there every day and courting international investment, is
trying to get investment in the Rakhine state, which is where the Rohingya come from. So
then it becomes a question of on whose land they are going to be building and on what
sites. And we know of the bulldozed and burned mosques and places that have other
historical and cultural significance to the Rohingya. How are states that are interested in
investing, or even—and I have to be very careful of what I say—
States that we have been talking to that are coming from the point of view of
development assistance and trying to do the right things, because this is a very poor part
of Myanmar. But our pushback with them is to say, “But who is this development
assistance going to benefit in Myanmar? You’re not consulting the Rohingya, who have
been cleansed out of that land, who are now sitting in Bangladesh. It’s only the remaining
people who are there that you’re talking to about investment and development.” So that is
actually a way in which for us the issue of culture comes up.
I want to give one other example. In many places that we deal with where there is
identity-based conflict, the most common way that this comes out is about appropriation
of cultural sites and changing them and trying to deny the previous existence of other
groups of people. And that is overwhelmingly a state-led process. That is where it happens.
They say, “This group of people didn’t exist here.” “Well, what do you mean, they didn’t
exist here?” There’s, “No, no, no, that’s not there anymore, or it’s been removed, or it’s
been eradicated.” It's a case of, “That mosque is a church or that church is now a mosque,”
or “It’s a Buddhist shrine,” or it’s something else other than what it was. “Oh, really?
Because there used to be a minaret there.” “No, never. There was never a . . . fill in the
blank.” It’s that kind of stuff. I am kind of making light of it, but that is the way in which it
comes up. It is about appropriation of culture and attempts to eradicate culture, not so
much through cruise missiles or tanks or people coming in and physically smashing stuff
down, but more through a kind of organized campaign by either state or non-state actors
to change, to alter, and to deny the presence of other people.
MONREAL I think this conversation is very interesting, although a bit speculative. But I
would also like to remind you that today, in the current conflicts we are discussing,
regular troops are not causing the majority of the damage but rather irregular troops. So
all these considerations are fine but not applicable. And the destruction is then, in most
cases, outside of armed actions, done for ideological reasons. The destruction in Palmyra
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was done completely outside the battle context, and so on. So what I am missing here is
consideration of the role of the local populations. We have not discussed that. We have
been seeing the conflicts from outside, and we thought perhaps that the people on the
ground, those who really own Bamiyan or Aleppo, have nothing to do. And we have not
discussed what the means of empowering them are. The best protection is close range. It is
the people who live there and who really have a sense of ownership of those places. We
have not discussed that; we have not touched on that. There are some ideas about it that
have been discussed in other fora. And that should be preventive; it should be within the
local populations’ notions, support, capacity to document, capacity to know, like in civil
emergencies. And we have not discussed that. And that, I think, if you want to have future
meetings of this kind, is the missing agenda of these two days.
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NEXT STEPS AND CONCLUDING
REMARKS
THOMAS G. WEISS Let me try to summarize, however inadequately, two things from
what I have heard. This effort is to either reduce destruction or improve protection. But I
suddenly realized, throughout the course of the conversation, that in our title we wrote “in
Zones of Armed Conflict.” And listening to many of the places that people are worried
about, lots of them are armed conflicts, but there is often a dispute about what is a war,
what is really a declared war or an undeclared war. So there are three things that almost
everyone would agree on, I think. ISIS contributes to our problems. And is the global war
on terror really a war or not? Yet we need to look at those. The slow-motion attack on
Uyghurs, or the rapid attack on the Rohingya—we want those in our project as well. But
are those wars? No, not declared, although the impact on civilians is the equivalent. So I
think we are back, actually, to where we started this whole effort. Namely, we are not
going to call our focus “the responsibility to protect” but “mass atrocities.” So, this project
is really about cultural heritage and mass atrocities, because that gives us more room on
the margins. But it also allows us to focus, I think, on what has brought us together. What I
am proposing is an adaptation of the 1954 Convention’s title. We are not going to create
any international law but seek “the protection of cultural heritage in the event of mass
atrocities,” to paraphrase the convention’s title.
So, if I understand that convention, I count four kinds of destruction. Again, it is
incidental destruction and purposeful or intentional destruction. We are actually not
looking at the incidental. We are not going to contribute any original research or insights
on collateral damage. We are not really going to contribute anything new on forced
neglect. We are going to focus our research efforts on the protection and care of heritage
in light of atrocities. What we are looking at is the intentional destruction of heritage that
has no military significance. The purpose of such attacks is to destroy people’s lives and
destroy their futures. So there are two kinds of destruction to erase history: looting—we’ve
talked about that—and strategic targeting. And it seems to me that that is where our
comparative advantage lies.
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The second big takeaway—and we have spent a lot of time on this—is the lack of data,
the lack of evidence, the lack of knowledge on any topic that we should address. At best,
we have poor data. Many of us stated this, I think, by saying it is hard or impossible to
separate heritage and people. I think what we have come around to saying is that they are
intertwined. It may be operationally, legally, and conceptually difficult to pull them apart;
but for certain purposes, we are going to have to try to get a better handle on tradeoffs,
contradictions, and priorities. Jim [Cuno] and I are going to have to do more than refer to
Heine and Lemkin and say that heritage and people are linked. We have to see when and
where they are linked. I believe that the attacks on immovable heritage would be a good
trigger for R2P thinking. But is that always the case, or usually, or mostly a good indicator?
Is it always a precursor? Is it always reliable or not? And that is, as you said, Paul [Wise],
an empirical question. How can we quantify our concerns? It is not going to be easy, but
there have to be ways we can attach numbers to them.
In a related way, if we are going to do consequentialist ethics, we actually have to have
far more empirical data if policy makers or we ourselves are going to say “yes” or “no” or
“maybe.” But I think we have overly simplified the argument by trying to say that it is
going to be binary: either/or. There really are multiple reasons—and we have emphasized
that over the past two days—to appreciate cultural heritage, why different people want to
protect it or destroy it. We cannot sweep all that away. There are really multiple reasons.
So whether something feels right or true, I think we have relied too much on anecdotes, or
at least intuition, which is not the best way to push forward new policies. So even if there
were sufficient political will to do something—and there certainly is not to routinely
protect people or heritage—I think at least the social scientists in the room should
appreciate why it is tough for states or international organizations to act without a more
precise notion of what is worth doing versus not worth doing.
HARTWIG FISCHER Many cases that we have discussed over the past two days show how
difficult it is to impose rules to protect cultural heritage and how difficult it is to make
people abide by these rules, despite all the work that has been done to strengthen the
awareness of what is at risk, which actions can be sanctioned, and what can be punished.
If we adapt a strategy of de-investment to curb damage to the environment, the challenge
we are facing becomes this: can we convince businesses to de-invest where cultural
heritage is put at risk, damaged, or destroyed? Can we establish a system to
sanction—financially, not just through naming and shaming—those who damage or
destroy cultural heritage, in order to impose awareness that putting cultural heritage at
risk, damaging or destroying it, does not happen without consequences? Yesterday, Tim
[Potts] discussed investing in or profiting financially from the destruction of cultural
heritage because it offers building opportunities. Follow the money. The war on drugs and
the war on trafficking in arms seem related. So can we use these methods to intensify
pressure to keep people from causing damage to cultural heritage?
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In view of the many cases of damage that were presented during the last two days, I
cannot tell if I’m depressed or inspired by our conversation. I must acknowledge a certain
ambivalence. But the people and expertise you have brought together are truly inspiring. I
have learned a lot, and I am grateful for that.
For me personally, three areas of thought and action seem particularly relevant. The
first is the importance of communities, on local, national, and global levels, that identify
with cultural heritage and thus have a natural propensity to take care of it. The second is
norms and sanctions. And the third is the inherent tension, or discrepancy, between policy
making on the one hand and the reality of power politics on the other. To better protect
cultural heritage, we will have to remain aware of these three interrelated considerations.
Irina [Bokova] reminded us yesterday that setting norms does have a long-term,
sustainable impact. We reflected on the major change in people’s concept of environment
and wildlife. Or go back and consider for a moment the immense struggle in the
nineteenth century to get people to recognize that slavery is unacceptable: it required an
enormous effort, but the change of norms ultimately did change people’s perception and
understanding. The struggle, as we all know, isn’t over.
There are many opportunities to change norms at all three of the nested levels of
community, but it requires proactive measures of training and capacity building. We have
to work on people’s norms at as many of those levels as we can. We are impeded in that,
however, by the fact that nation-states stand between the international community and
local communities. And we can only change norms and educate and train at the level of
the local communities if we have the agreement of the states that have theoretical
sovereignty over those areas. That is a very hard thing to do, but we still have to do it. So I
would say that one of the basic principles would be—getting back to the discussion
yesterday about UNESCO—to stress the “E” in UNESCO and really focus on education,
training, and these proactive measures to get people to think about heritage in a different
way. We need soft power, training, and systems of incentives in long-term projects to make
people understand that they have something to lose, to educate them and have them
internalize changed norms.
The other thing that really struck me in our conversation today is that imposing recipes
or rules from the top down simply does not work. There are no one-size-fits-all solutions.
We should, instead of focusing on rules, focus on developing an agreed-upon set of
variables to consider as part of a process. And the particular mix of how you assign value
to different things, how you prioritize those things, that is all going to be dictated by the
particulars of the specific situation and at the same time influenced by politics and power.
It’s hard to control these dynamics.
Deploying soft power, meaning incentivizing people and focusing on education, will
eventually have an impact on nation-state politics. We have to integrate heritage and
economics into a framework that makes it attractive for nation-state governments to
protect their own heritage and at the same time to not run roughshod over local
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communities. We can apply these principles to develop smaller-scale, pragmatically
focused projects that in the end will have a long-term cumulative effect.
LUIS MONREAL We are in a crisis situation. And crisis generates emotion. Somebody
around this table wrote a book called Art and Emotion. So we need to use the emotional
power of cultural heritage. This is what speaks to people. Of course, it is relevant to
society. It has to appeal to the emotional intelligence. I think the people in the
environment field have done that. They do not talk about the science of the environment;
they talk about emotions. That is the point. And in these situations of crisis, the context is
even more emotional.
The second thing—I think you said it—is that we need to work with local people. And
this is part of the agenda. We have to empower, through training, through planning, first
the professionals on the ground, our colleagues on the ground on all levels, from
craftsmen to museum directors, curators, and so on. And we have to mobilize civil society
organizations. That is fundamental. But we have to anticipate that we are entering
postwar situations. Postwar situations are equally very dangerous for cultural heritage.
Building becomes a priority, and these people need to work quickly. So you see the
example of Afghanistan, what is happening to Herat. I think this is also an agenda you
should put on the table.
IRINA BOKOVA Thank you very much for inviting me to join this group and this, I would
say, very exciting and sometimes unexpected discussion—because I think in looking at
heritage, I am used to an environment where there are experts and we are all like-minded
people. Here we enlarged the space, and I think it is the right approach. I think with the
future work, the publication, if there are events or activities around it, I think it is a great
opportunity, on one side, to focus on advocacy once again, to keep the political
momentum. Keeping the political momentum is very important after this period of a very
high level of interest from political communities and from global leaders. I am afraid that
changing geopolitics will shift attention from this issue. It is not a priority anymore. There
are no longer these kinds of threats. And I think it is very dangerous. So with this
publication, if we could keep the political momentum within the UN environment and
widely, I think it will be very good.
The legal framework: I think I said yesterday that adopting a new law or changing a
law is complicated. There is not much appetite on the part of member states. I mentioned
the historic urban landscapes for which we wanted to make a convention but ended up
with a recommendation. Still, it is a step forward. But I think there is a lot of need, and
maybe the publication can recommend something that exists in some of the papers, to
look actually at the armed non-state actors and what their responsibility is and how to
approach them. The work that the NGO Geneva Call is doing on humanitarian protection,
enlarging it now with work on the protection of cultural heritage, is very interesting. It is
pioneering work in terms of enlarging the space for international law where it does not
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exist. I could maybe compare it very briefly with the refugee law and internally displaced
people. We know, all the UN people working in the humanitarian system, that internally
displaced people were not included in the refugee convention of 1951. And that is why it
was difficult to work with them. But they were a reality. Finally in 2016, the General
Assembly adopted the declaration and made this possible. So we have to be creative also
in looking at how we deal with them—they call them actors—those who are in most cases
destroying heritage. And we have to think about the place for the international law or
some kind of another arrangement in order for them to work.
Two last remarks. Local communities. What about communities where the heritage
they have is not from their culture? I have confronted this. I mentioned an exchange I had
in a school in Tunisia. I was coming from the Bardo Museum. I went to a school, and I said,
“Oh, you have fantastic Roman mosaics, and it’s so incredible. You have to feel very
proud.” And a girl came up and said, “Why should I be proud of something that does not
belong to my culture?” So this comes down to education. This type of work is tedious, but
it is important; we have to do it. And this is exactly the soft power, both of culture and of
education, if we want to protect and preserve cultural heritage
My last point. I think our discussion would benefit immensely from some really good
empirical data or empirical examples that can demonstrate what we want to achieve. We
spoke about how Borobudur was cleaned after the eruption of the volcano, and the
Muslim community was caring about cleaning a Buddhist temple. This is a small thing, but
there are many more that are good examples of this type of caring about cultural heritage
that is not exactly ours. Or it is ours but much neglected. There are other points, but these
are some of the ideas that came to my mind just today.
ISMAIL SERAGELDIN I would like to thank you and thank everybody for this. It has been
a very, very stimulating couple of days. But I still have two more things that I would like to
emphasize. One is the fact that there is a case, a very special case, of historic cities or
historic districts where, in fact, as I tried to say, the individual buildings are not very
significant. But it is the whole—the character, the urban character, that intangible
quality—that makes this particular sense of place meaningful and attractive. We need to
also include that. When we talk about Aleppo, there is the souq, and there is a citadel, and
so on. There are some important monuments per se; but beyond the monuments, there is
the overall quality. And that frequently is under attack on a day-to-day basis, by local
people, like the story of the parking lot that was turned into apartment buildings, and so
on, which results in loss of cultural heritage over a longer period. It is like a slow, creeping
disease, as opposed to war—fog of war and destruction of war. But we have to recognize
that cities are living organisms, and different generations have different views about what
is important, and local communities have their own perspective about what they need. I
think that part—the historic cities part or the historic districts part—was not, perhaps,
sufficiently captured in our discussion.
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And finally, I would return again to the suggestion that I think we can do something
short of intervention during or immediately after wars and conflicts. And that would be to
take the approach of disaster-risk reduction. We want this to be not just for protection
against a tsunami or a nuclear meltdown; we want it to be also to protect cultural heritage
against the ravages of time or the ravages of the insensitivity of particular people. And
there again, like Irina said, you have education and culture and so on.
SCOTT SAGAN I have learned a lot, so thank you. Three points. First, on the laws of
armed conflict, there are often differences between what people will call standards and
rules. And the metaphor that I have been using is driving. The rule is you cannot drive
above seventy miles an hour. The standard is that you cannot drive recklessly. And when
you design international rules, you have to choose which of those, and how much
emphasis, how much specificity, you want, versus how much judgment you want. Most of
what we have been talking about is standards. “Proportionality” does not tell you how you
actually measure; it just tells you that you have to think about making a measure.
“Feasible precautions” does not say what feasible is; it says that you have to take some risk
or make an assessment. There are two standards, however; I mean, two cases where there
are rules. That is, you do not deliberately kill civilians. The principle of distinction is strict.
And I think we just need to have such. You do not deliberately destroy cultural heritage.
That is a rule. That is not a standard. That is not one that you have to make judgments
about. So viewing this in that straightforward way is important. And what I think some of
the dangers are is that when somebody starts violating a rule, it may soften your views
about the standards. We have to be very cautious that as we are combating people who
are breaking rules, we do not, as we did with torture in the United States, say, “Well, it’s
okay to torture these guys because of what they’ve done.” We should not change our views
about how we evaluate standards because of that. And therefore, I think that is a
cautionary note.
Second, I still think that it would be very valuable to try to figure out whether you
should think about cultural heritage as a part of collateral damage that you are trying to
avoid, measuring it against military advantage, or whether you should think about
cultural heritage as part of military advantage broadly conceived to include peace and
reconciliation contributions afterward. That is a very different conceptual framework; it
could lead to different areas.
PAUL H. WISE My suggestion is that we recognize that we need to enhance the political
costs and enhance the political benefits of protecting cultural sites. And to do that will
require technical guidance, new norms, education, empirical analysis. But it will
ultimately depend on doing things differently than we have done them in the past. The
challenges that we are facing are different in nature and intensity, and the status quo
approaches need to be rethought, in my view. And I think the crucial issue will be to create
linkages with disciplines and arenas of activity that are equally committed to social well-
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being and the protection of lives and to craft our analyses and create a kind of approach
that we have discussed here for the past two days but make it accessible and compelling to
other groups that are essential to creating, if you will, solidarity across different
dimensions within a broad commitment to human life and social well-being. It will
include enhanced voices from the victim communities. I think that is clear for local
communities; that it is as increasingly essential to the protection of humanitarian workers
as it is for cultural sites. But I would also suggest—and this is peculiar, as a pediatrician
sitting in the Getty—that we look at other disciplines and forms that provide deeper
insight into the power of cultural heritage to shape social well-being. I am talking about
artists, musicians, poets, and novelists, because they can capture in different ways the
importance of some of the cultural, not only objects, but intangible cultural concerns that
academics and anthropologists, archaeologists, and a pediatrician could never do. As this
initiative moves forward, whichever direction it takes, it should be very purposeful in
thinking about how to build these bridges, how to make these analyses and concerns
accessible and also compelling to the other essential voices that will ultimately prove
highly beneficial to raise the political cost so that there is enforcement and enhance the
political benefits that could shape a greater state or non-state commitment to the
protection of sites. Non-state actors respond to political costs and benefits like anybody
else. And questions of legitimacy and the use of coercion are essential. But others are
worried about this, too, and struggling with the same landscapes. My hope is that we can
broaden this conversation and ultimately make it accessible and powerful to those
essential groups.
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